Civil Unrest & Rioting

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Operation Garden Plot (United States Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2) Under this plan for the deployment of Operation Garden Plot, the use of CIDCON-1 will be mandatory. This direct support of civil disturbance control operations is to be used by the Army, USAF, Navy, and Marine Corp. with an airlift force to be comprised of MAC Organic Airlift Resources, airlift capable aircraft of all other USAF major commands, and all other aerial reconnaissance and Airborne Psychological Operations. This is to include control communications systems, aeromedical evacuation, helicopter and Weather Support Systems. If any civil disturbance by a resistance group, religious organization, or other persons considered to be non-conformist takes place, under Appendix 3 to Annex B of Plan 55-2 hereby gives all Federal forces total power over the situation if local and state authorities cannot put down said dissenters. Annex A, section B of Operation Garden Plot defines tax protesters, militia groups, religious cults, and general anti-government dissenters as Disruptive Elements. This calls for the deadly force to be used against any extremist or dissident perpetrating any and all forms of civil disorder. See also: US HAS BEEN PREPARING TO TURN AMERICA INTO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

JP 3-06. Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. September 16, 2002. This publication addresses the planning and conduct of joint urban operations and explains how they differ from other operations. It focuses on the operational level of war and addresses issues across the range of military operations. It provides doctrinal guidance focused on capabilities and tasks that are unique to, or significantly challenged by, the urban environment at the operational level of warfighting. It does not attempt to replace or reiterate doctrine in overlapping areas; instead, it examines the special considerations required when conducting operations in the complex modern urban environment. [Link updated 4/14/11]

John Stanton: Is Anarchy the Only Hope for America? The philosopher Plato was right when he opined that democracy ultimately leads to anarchy and then tyranny. But he was wrong to dismiss anarchy which, arguably, is the happy medium between failed democracy and treacherous tyranny. The USA has begun its flirtation with anarchy. But anarchy, like democracy, is anathema to the ruling classes and can't be tolerated for any length of time. As a result, the ruling classes will create a crisis and will attempt to implement a society as described in Plato's Republic - an alternative to representative government. The USA will transition from anarchy to a Platonic tyranny sometime during the second term (2004-2008) of George Bush II... That is, unless anarchy takes hold.

Irregular Warfare Special Study by the Joint Warfighting Center USJFCOM, 4 Aug 2006. See also: IRREGULAR WARFARE – PERHAPS NOT SO “IRREGULAR” by Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Miller, United States Army

Guerrilla Warfare Tactics In Urban Environments by MAJ Patrick D. Marques, 57 pages. ~ Current Special Forces doctrine is very limited concerning the conduct of guerrilla warfare combat operations in urban environments. The focus of the current doctrine is on conducting combat operations in rural environments. The material available on urban environments is defined in broad terms primarily focused on the larger picture of unconventional warfare. Some considerations and characteristics of urban tactical operations are addressed but are so general they could be applied to a conventional infantry unit as easily as to a guerrilla force. Traditionally, Special Forces guerrilla warfare doctrine has focused on its conduct in a rural environment as historically, most guerrilla movements have formed, operated, and been supported outside of the cities. Increasing world urbanization is driving the “center of gravity” of the resistance, the populace and their will to resist, into urban settings. As populations have gravitated to the cities on every continent, the ability to prosecute a successful guerrilla war has often depended on the ability to conduct combat operations in these environments. Predominantly, the aspects of unconventional warfare that were executed in urban settings were those such as intelligence activities, recruiting, sabotage, or subversion. Guerrilla warfare combat operations were done in urban environments only when absolutely necessary.

Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency - Max Manwaring. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2005. Gang-related crime, in conjunction with the instability it wreaks upon governments, is now a serious national security and sovereignty problem in important parts of the global community. Although differences between gangs and insurgents exist, in terms of original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infers that the gang phenomenon is a mutated form of urban insurgency. That is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links gangs and insurgents is that the gangs’ and insurgents’ ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries.

The Urban Threat: Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999. Urban guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations clearly constitute one of the greatest threats to our forces abroad. Because of the randomness and unpredictability of guerrilla offensive operations and terrorist acts, it is important that all service members, private through general, understand these organizations and the threat that they pose. This paper examines the nature of urban warfare from the perspective of irregular paramilitary groups; i.e., the kinds of organizations that U.S. expeditionary forces are likely to encounter while engaged in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and regional stabilization. More specifically, the paper profiles the nature and composition of such groups, identifies their most likely objectives, and discusses how they go about achieving those ends.

Urban Population Control in a Counterinsurgency - Mounir Elkhamri, Lester W. Grau, Laurie King-Irani, Amanda S. Mitchell and Lenny Tasa-Bennett. Article, 2004. Much of urban counter-insurgency resembles police work and consequently is alien and anathema to the military. Yet much of the police intelligence techniques, relationships with bureaucracy, and maintenance of law and order are central to successful urban counterinsurgency. How does the military adjust to police methods without assuming police missions and police restrictions? How does the military supplement police missions without supplanting police control and responsibility? How do police and military forces and leaders interact and cooperate to achieve common goals?

War in the 21st Century: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly - Knowing and Finding the Adversary in the Three Block War - Commander Martin Adamson, Canadian Navy. Canadian Forces College seminar paper, October 2003. This paper will assert that modern land-based conflict is evolving to encompass the model of the “three block war,” one in which the full spectrum of conflict will arise within a few hours and within a few city blocks. Enhanced surveillance as well as a deep understanding of the adversary’s motivation and culture will be key factors in determining a coalition’s success in defeating an asymmetric opponent. To chart this course, an initial review of the changing nature of war will be conducted. Evolving technologies and techniques necessary for both knowing and identifying asymmetric adversaries will then be assessed. Finally, conclusions relevant to Canada’s ability to operate within the “three block war” will be rendered.

Analysis of Casualty Rates & Patterns Likely to Result from Military Operations in Urban Environments - Colonel (Retd) RA Leitch MBE RGN, Dr. HR Champion F.R.C.S (Edin) F.A.C.S. and Dr. JF Navein MB ChB M.RC.G.P. US Marine Corps Study, 1997. The study was conducted as part of the U.S. Marine Corps Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory’s initiatives to develop an perational health care doctrine in support of the U.S. Marine Corps’ emerging tactical doctrine “From the Sea”. It was tasked specifically to examine the impact of casualty rates and wounding patterns in urban operations.

Ready for Armageddon: Proceedings of the 2001 RAND Arroyo-Joint ACTD-CETO-USMC Nonlethal and Urban Operations Program Urban Operations Conference - Dr. Russell Glenn, etal. On March 22–23, 2001, four organizations co-hosted the fourth annual Urban Operations Conference overseen by RAND Arroyo Center. These organizations were the Military Operations in Urban Terrain Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration, the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, the United States Marine Corps Nonlethal and Urban Operations Program, and the Arroyo Center itself. Consistent with the first three Urban Operations conferences, the objective of this cooperative effort was to identify and investigate notably critical topics of concern to those responsible for making decisions on, preparing for, and conducting operations in urban areas anywhere in the world. This document summarizes the results of the two-day conference.

The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations - Scott Gerwehr and Russell Glenn. Rand study, 2000. Urban operations are a significant and enduring challenge by virtually any measure; but a battle on friendly urban terrain offers the weaker of combatants a chance to reduce the advantages of a stronger adversary. Something similar might be said of deception, historically a frequent resort of the underdog. Both the battle on friendly urban terrain and the employment of deception might be fairly characterized as asymmetric strategies, aimed at reducing an opponent’s strengths and exposing his weaknesses. The admixture of these two strategies—when deception is employed in the urban environment— presents a powerful synergy. (pdf) [Files recovered, compiled and now hosted on site!]

Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat - Dr. Russell Glenn. Rand study, 1998. Contemporary international and domestic security environments increasingly demand United States armed services’ and unified commands’ commitment to military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). The nation’s soldiers and marines have been fighting in cities for much of the nation’s history, but there is evidence that traditional definitions of success under such conditions may no longer apply. Success in accomplishing the assigned military mission can fall short of national political objectives if the cost of that accomplishment includes too great a loss of American or noncombatant life. This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Army’s readiness to undertake modern MOUT missions; it also notes shortfalls in the nation’s other armed services’ urban operations readiness as appropriate.

Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000-2025 - Russell Glenn, Randall Steeb and John Matsumura. Rand study, 2000. The challenges of today’s urban operations arise from the vast expanses of man-made structures, the tens of thousands of innocent civilians, and the need to preserve friendly force and noncombatant lives as well as physical infrastructure. Successfully addressing these challenges requires moving away from a reliance on the predominantly firepower-based doctrines of the past. This document provides one such alternative.

The Battle for Fallujah: The Underlying Military Issues - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2004. Urban warfare can be highly unpredictable. There is a tendency to assume that because some of the bloodiest battles in history have occurred in cities, all such battles are bloody. In practice, many urban defenses collapse almost immediately, partly through inexperience but more often because the defender is not committed to an almost suicidal form of last ditch combat. The rapid fall of Baghdad in 2003 is a good example of a rapid collapse caused by both military incompetence on the part of defender (and high confidence on the part of the attacker) and a lack of commitment to final combat. Fallujah seems far more likely to have a determined set of defenders, although this is not certain. It certainly has enough armed Islamists and potential diehards, and Zarqawi and others have already promised a bitter battle. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CHAPTER 7 FM 100-19 FMFM 7-10 DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS 1 July 1993 [Links updated 4/14/11]

Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio William W. Mendel, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. July 1996 ~ The U.S. military experience during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots and the 1995 experience of the Brazilian Armed Forces in countering criminals in Rio de Janeiro offer insights for civilian and military leaders. These kinds of domestic support operations have made the military-law enforcement nexus an important dimension of today's national security environment. They underscore the importance of up-to-date procedures for interagency coordination, and renewed military doctrine and training.

Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots CHRISTOPHER M. SCHNAUBELT Parameters, Summer 1997, pp. 88-109. "Police officers responded to a domestic dispute, accompanied by marines. They had just gone up to the door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the officers. One yelled `cover me!' to the marines, who then laid down a heavy base of fire. . . . The police officer had not meant `shoot' when he yelled `cover me' to the marines. [He] meant . . . point your weapons and be prepared to respond if necessary. However, the marines responded instantly in the precise way they had been trained, where `cover me' means provide me with cover using firepower. . . . over two hundred bullets [were] fired into that house."[1] (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

FM 3-06, Chapter 1, Urban Outlook Modern urban operations span the full range of possible applications of military power. At the high end of the spectrum of conflict is major theater war (MTW) dominated by offensive and defensive operations that, when undertaken, will commonly include urban operations. At the lowest level are a multitude of urban peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. These activities foster and strengthen alliances and coalitions as well as deter aggression on the part of potential threats.

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, The- Civil disorder- preparing for the worst - Cover Story Studies of the violent riots in Los Angeles and Miami, as well as a series of disturbances that took place in the Miami area throughout the 1980s, reveal a clear pattern in modern civil unrest. The seven elements of this pattern include... [Compiled and converted to pdf format and now hosted on site!]

Civil Commotion, Civil Unrest Riots are a common facet of modern living everywhere. But what are the key exposures reinsurers should be aware of? Simon Sole, managing director of Exclusive Analysis, breaks these down and offers predictions for this year.

The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012 by CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR.; From Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20.: The letter that follows takes us on a darkly imagined excursion into the future. A military coup has taken place in the United States--the year is 2012--and General Thomas E. T. Brutus, Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the United States, now occupies the White House as permanent Military Plenipotentiary. His position has been ratified by a national referendum, though scattered disorders still prevail and arrests for acts of sedition are underway. A senior retired officer of the Unified Armed Forces, known here simply as Prisoner 222305759, is one of those arrested, having been convicted by court-martial for opposing the coup. Prior to his execution, he is able to smuggle out of prison a letter to an old War College classmate discussing the "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." In it, he argues that the coup was the outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992. These trends were the massive diversion of military forces to civilian uses, the monolithic unification of the armed forces, and the insularity of the military community. His letter survives and is here presented verbatim. It goes without saying (I hope) that the coup scenario above is purely a literary device intended to dramatize my concern over certain contemporary developments affecting the armed forces, and is emphatically not a prediction. -- The Author (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach by Sean M. Maloney; From Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 135-52.: The application of military force by a democratic government within the confines of its borders, and in some cases against its citizenry, has long been a controversial and politically sensitive topic. Though that is not a new type of operation for either the American or the Canadian military establishments, the nature of the threats each is being asked to confront has evolved. The threats now include (in addition to natural disasters and minor urban unrest) cult groups armed with weapons of mass destruction, agents of narco-parastates in Latin and South America, organized and armed urban unrest, and the violent potential of private paramilitary groups. It is safe to assert that threats to North American domestic security will increase in nature, scope, and number in the next century. This in turn will presumably prompt more debate on and calls for an increase in the military's role in containing and neutralizing those threats. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization by Robert J. Bunker: From Parameters, Summer 1997, pp. 15-25.: The United States must remain prepared for war, but not one understood by traditional perceptions of security... Our most likely adversaries will emerge from a process of human advancement, a cyclical shifting between order and chaos... the cycle, which is the topic of this article, now may be shifting away from stability toward chaos, suggesting that the nation-state may be entering a period in which its usefulness as a concept for organizing societies will be severely challenged. The United States has been less affected by this process than most other Western nation-states; we seem to prosper despite such challenges. However, the breakdown of the family, increased drug use among our children, the growing specter of gang violence, and other forms of social terrorism suggest that our own institutions are not immune to a degree of chaos. This article examines two periods of similar transition, and analyzes characteristics of contemporary values and institutions which suggest that the Western world may face a period comparable to previous epochal shifts in warfare. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat by TIMOTHY L. THOMAS; From Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 87-102.: The battle for Grozny, the capital of the small Russian Republic of Chechnya, took place in January 1995. It pitted a hastily assembled and unprepared Russian force against a Chechen force of regulars and guerrillas equipped with Russian weapons and a belief in their cause. The Chechens held their own for three weeks but eventually lost the city to the Russian armed forces in late January (the Chechens retook the city in August 1996). Both sides learned or relearned many lessons of urban combat, most of them the hard way.[1] This article examines the most important of those lessons, the interesting and perhaps surprising conclusions drawn by the Russians about modern urban warfare, and their implications for US soldiers and urban warfare theory. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

The Fed - Martha’s Civil Unrest Tips Recently, I have received a number of requests asking how to properly prepare a riot à la française. Many of my readers understand the good, old-fashioned American riot but have no idea where to begin with the French one. Do you burn the cars on the right side of the road or the left? My recipe for a Molotov cocktail is in gallons, how do I convert it into liters? What French expletive is customarily used? Worry no more, for I, Martha Stewart, will explain all... (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

How to Survive Civil Unrest - Travel Tips Sometimes things go bad -- really bad when you are traveling abroad. Hence The U.S. Government provides tips on what you should do when there is blood on the streets and tanks are rumbling through the central plaza.

Civil Unrest We haven't seen any serious civil unrest here in North America - not in our lifetimes - not really. Probably, the racial equality riots in the 60's are as bad as anything we've seen. But even then in those cities, was there still some kind of civil control, did the water continue to run - did the power stay on and could you buy a gallon of gas? Kelly experienced a major civil war in Africa and knows exactly what can happen when 'things really break down.' I think you'll learn a lot from this story. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

MARTIAL LAW The guide will help you plan, prepare, and get ready in the event that martial law threatens your safety and well being. It is divided into two parts. The first part describes the framework for martial law and the second part the actions to take in preparing or the actual declaration of martial law. [Link updated 4/14/11]

US Military Civil Disturbance Planning; The War at Home Under the heading of "civil disturbance planning", the U.S. military is training troops and police to suppress democratic opposition in America. The master plan, Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, is code-named, "Operation Garden Plot". Originated in 1968, the "operational plan" has been updated over the last three decades, most recently in 1991, and was activated during the Los Angeles "riots" of 1992, and more than likely during the recent anti-WTO "Battle in Seattle." (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

UNDERSTANDING RIOTS After the Los Angeles riot in spring of 1992, almost every pundit in the country took a turn at explaining why riots occur. The conventional wisdom on the subject went something like this: certain dramatic events such as political assassinations or unpopular jury verdicts crystallize riots from social rage. So to understand riots, one must understand the causes of social rage, usually said to be racism, poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and why people who experience this rage manage it in such a destructive manner. The usual suspects include breakdown of the family, television, and a generalized cultural disorientation.

The Coming Anarchy Very interesting article by Robert Kaplan in Atlantic Monthly (1994). This article gave me the creeps and I just scanned it as quickly as I could (thanks to Evelyn Woods). How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

Religiously based civil unrest and warfare Often, the media does not identify the precise causes of some of the conflicts around the world. Clashes are frequently described as being ethnic in origin, even though religion may have been a main cause. The true causes of unrest are sometimes difficult to determine. Frequently, there are a mixture of political alliances, economic differences, ethnic feuds, religious differences and others

The Effects of Civil Unrest Helping family and neighborhoods prepare for earthquakes, volcanoes, fires and floods, in Gig Harbor, Key Peninsula, and Pierce County.

Analysis of the 1992 Los Angeles Civil Unrest Beginning on the afternoon of April 29, 1992 and for the next three days, Los Angeles County was an area in turmoil. The verdict in the Rodney king trial generated an immediate response in the form of riots, looting and fires. Immediately after the civil unrest, the Employment Development Department (EDD) began an effort to assess the extent of the damage to businesses and the loss of jobs in the area. This report is a summary of EDD's findings following several months of research.

Los Angeles Riots-Series of Reports ...As 4,000 regular Army troops and 1,000 federal law enforcement officers move into Los Angeles, people have begun to actually assess the severity of this latest day of "revolution". They find thirty-eight (38) people dead, 1,250 people injured, 3,600 structural fires, hundreds of businesses looted and closed, and more than 3,000 people arrested. At least four (4) police officers and three (3) firefighters have been shot and hundreds of other injured as they attempted to control the fires and lawlessness of the past three days. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

The Detroit Riots of 1967- Events The Detroit Riot of 1967 began when police vice squad officers executed a raid on an after hours drinking club or “blind pig” in a predominantly black neighborhoods located at Twelfth Street and Clairmount Avenue. They were expecting to round up a few patrons, but instead found 82 people inside holding a party for two returning Vietnam veterans. Yet, the officers attempted to arrest everyone who was on the scene.

National Center for the Study of Police and Civil Disorder South Central Los Angeles, Liberty City, Harlem, Watts–the names of these American urban neighborhoods instantly remind us of how deeply the nation’s consciousness has been scarred by civil disorder. The spark that ignites the violence is always one incident, usually police-related. In its wake is a wounded city and a nation in shock. (pdf) [Link recovered 4/14/11 - now hosted on site!]

Iraq Training Assessment Trip Report The following report summarizes my recent training assessment trip to Iraq during July. All topics listed below were identified by the various units/ individuals from the perspective of what topics/events frequently dealt with in Iraq should be incorporated into the Urban Warfare predeployment training program.

G.N. McLean's The Rise and Fall of Anarchy in America 1886 FROM ITS INCIPIENT STAGE TO THE FIRST BOMB THROWN IN CHICAGO. A COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF THE GREAT CONSPIRACY CULMINATING IN THE Haymarket Massacre, MAY 4th, 1886. A MINUTE ACCOUNT OF THE APPREHENSION, TRIAL, CONVICTION AND EXECUTION OF THE LEADING CONSPIRATORS. [Link updated 4/14/11 ~ Now linking to complete text (pdf)]

Coming Anarchy I don't really know where these folks are going - their tagline is "Speak Victorian, think Pagan" and their focus is all over the timeline. Interesting place to visit, tho.

Anarchy in the U.S.A., by Charles M. Young Noam Chomsky interviewed by Charles M. Young, Rolling Stone, May 28, 1992. Some viewers may be insulted by this link. The point is, anarchy, riots, and civil unrest comes from disagreements (hatred, even) between parties and peoples - and LOTS of people think the way NC and the Rolling Stone do.

RACE WAR IN THE FUTURE FOR USA? LBJ, and the Immigration Act of 1965 opened the floodgates of immigration from third world nations. California is the first state to show, via 2000 census, that traditional whites are a minority. If the trend continues, whites will be a minority in the entire nation by 2050. We could so easily see what happened in the Balkans, also happen here in the USA. Apparently multicultural, multi-racial, and multi-ethnic democracies do not survive long. The minute the majority race, or culture loses it's position of majority, the nation begins to undergo internal fracturing. It is my contention this is/was the plan beginning in 1965.

Juan Santos: Immigration Endgame

What Drives Societal Collapse We do, however, have distinct advantages over societies in the past, because we can anticipate the future. Although far from perfect, and perhaps subject to unexpected non-linearities, general circulation models provide a road map for how the climate system is likely to evolve in the future. We also know where population growth will be greatest. We must use this information to design strategies that minimize the impact of climate change on societies that are at greatest risk. This will require substantial international cooperation, without which the 21st century will likely witness unprecedented social disruptions.

Muslim American Society Islam is the fastest growing religion in North America. Islam’s appeal lies in the simplicity of its principles. In its harmonious interplay of faith with reason, its vision coordinates the sacred and the secular into a comprehensive whole. Due to Islam’s stress on equality and brotherhood of its community, it has special appeal for the historically oppressed. These egalitarian principles also draw converts from the middle class America. Thus, mosques, Islamic centers and schools truly represent a melting pot for the Muslims all over America...

America Alone The U.S. government’s National Intelligence Council is predicting the EU will collapse by 2020... How bad is it going to get in Europe? As bad as it can get – as in societal collapse, fascist revivalism, and the long Eurabian night, not over the entire Continent but over significant parts of it. And those countries that manage to escape the darkness will do so only after violent convulsions of their own.”

View From the Wolves' Den - The Chechens and Urban Operations - David Dilegge. Small Wars and Insurgencies article, 2001. In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian forces in the 1994-1996 conflict. The Corps was particularly interested in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.

David Slays Goliath: A Chechen Perspective on the War in Chechnya (1994 - 1996) - Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Jackson, USMC. Marine Corps Wargaming Division paper, 2000. On 11 December 1994, 40,000 troops of the Russian Army attacked into the breakaway republic of Chechnya, with the intent of removing Chechen separatist leader, Jokhar Dudayev, and replacing his government with one more favorable to Moscow. Two years later, the last units of the Russian force withdrew from Chechnya, culminating two years of humiliation at the hands of a much smaller and far more modestly equipped foe.

General-Major Tourpal-Ali Kaimov - On Urban Warfare in Chechnya - David Dilegge. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity paper, 2000. In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian forces in the 1994-1996 conflict. The Corps was particularly interested in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.

Tactical Observations from the Grozny Combat Experience - Major Brett Jenkinson, USA. US Army Command and General Staff College thesis, 2002. The Russian battles for Grozny, Chechnya provide relevant contemporary examples for the study of urban combat involving modern, conventional forces on one side and a guerrilla force on the other. The first and fourth battles for Grozny, a city of nearly a half million people, were the major Russian assaults to seize the city from the Chechens during the latter’s struggle for secession from the Russian Federation. This thesis provides an explanation of the historical method used, a history of the Chechen-Russian relations leading to the battles, a description of the first and fourth battles, their lessons learned, and an analysis of the value of those lessons learned. This thesis provides a frame of reference for future urban combat and highlights valuable techniques to improve urban combat military theory.

The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat - Timothy Thomas. Parameters article, Summer 1999. The battle for Grozny, the capital of the small Russian Republic of Chechnya, took place in January 1995. It pitted a hastily assembled and unprepared Russian force against a Chechen force of regulars and guerrillas equipped with Russian weapons and a belief in their cause. The Chechens held their own for three weeks but eventually lost the city to the Russian armed forces in late January (the Chechens retook the city in August 1996). Both sides learned or relearned many lessons of urban combat, most of them the hard way. This article examines the most important of those lessons, the interesting and perhaps surprising conclusions drawn by the Russians about modern urban warfare, and their implications for US soldiers and urban warfare theory.

Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny, 1994-1995 - Cadet Sean McCafferty. US Military Academy paper, May 2000. Historically, MOUT has always been the bloodiest type of battle, from the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago to the first Battle of Grozny, only five years ago. MOUT is not a mission, nor is it simply a type of terrain. Instead, MOUT is an entirely different environment. Military Operations in Urban Terrain are going to be unavoidable in the future: the world’s cities are going to be the battleground. First, cities are naturally strategically key terrain. Cities are usually the economic, political, and psychological centers of gravity of states. Cities are where the nation keeps its treasured possessions, museums, banks, and businesses.

Echoes of Chechnya Warfare Resound in Moscow, Quantico - Robert Ackerman. Link to Signal Magazine article, 2000. Several months of Russian attacks have shifted the balance of power in Chechnya and changed U.S. thinking about urban warfare. After suffering stunning public defeats just a few years ago, Russian forces applied painful lessons learned then to drive Chechen forces out of their capital city, Grozny, this year. Yet, according to U.S. analysts, this may have merely altered the thrust of battle, not resolved it. And, the tactics employed by both sides are forcing U.S. experts to take another look at the concept of urban warfare.

Russia's Chechen Wars 1994 - 2000: Lessons from Urban Combat - Olga Oliker. Rand study, 2001.An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time.

Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny - Lester Grau. INSS Strategic Forum article, July 1995. Combat in cities is not an easy option for any army and makes inordinate demands on logistics and available manpower. Soviet urban tactics were designed to complement large-scale high-tempo offensive operations on the territory of a foreign country. Undefended enemy cities would be captured from the march. Defended cities would be bypassed. The enemy was a foreign professional soldier who had no desire to participate in the destruction of his own cities and would prefer declaring an open city instead of seeing it reduced to rubble. Today's political and military reality no longer fit the underlying Soviet assumptions of urban combat. Now, irregular forces, whose political agenda is strengthened by the destruction of cities, fight Russian forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Recent fighting for Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, led to the revision of Russian urban tactics. While the initial Russian attack was a debacle, the Russian Army pulled itself together and eventually captured the city. Since then, the Russian Army has been slowly improving on its performance, refitting its forces and concentrating on finishing the fight. Since much went wrong, the Russians are studying the lessons from that combat and updating their urban tactics.

Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny - Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas. Marine Corps Gazette article, April 2000. Two years ago, Mr. Thomas gave a conference briefing on the Russian lessons learned from the first battle for Grozny (January 1995). Apparently, a conference participant put his notes of the briefing on the Internet and these notes have enjoyed a long run. However, some of the notes were slightly exaggerated from the original presentation. With the third battle of Grozny just concluded (second battle was August 1996, third battle January 2000), The Marine Corps Gazette decided to reprint the original lessons learned with minor adjustments from Mr. Thomas, and add FMSO's Russian lessons learned from their subsequent battles for Grozny. The latter represents the joint work of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Grau.

Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas - Ali Jalali and Lester Grau. Infantry article, January-April 1999. Urban guerrilla combat is difficult for the urban guerrilla and the regular force. Throughout the war, the Soviets and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces were never able to completely control the major cities of Kandahar and Herat. Finally, the Soviets bombed 75% of Herat and virtually the entire Kandahar suburb into rubble. That still failed to stop the urban guerrillas. The DRA and Soviets had more success in controlling the capital city of Kabul--but still were unable to stop the rocket attacks and guerrilla actions. Surviving urban guerrillas are harder to find to interview than guerrillas who fought in the country. Urban guerrillas are surrounded by potential informants and government spies. They must frequently move around unarmed and the government can usually react to their actions much faster than they can in the countryside. The urban guerrilla must be anonymous and ruthless to survive. For this reason, urban guerrilla groups were usually small and fought back with short-duration actions. Many urban guerrillas lived in the countryside or suburbs and only entered the cities for combat. The Soviets and DRA devoted a great deal of effort to finding and eliminating the urban guerrilla. Many innocent civilians were victims of this hunt. The authors are grateful to the urban guerrillas who provided these candid interviews.

Northern Ireland: The Time And Place For Urban Terror - Major Michael Maloney, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College seminar paper, 1985. This is a study of urban guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland and principally the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Inherent in such a study are several major obstacles. First, guerrillas involved in guerrilla warfare, and particularly a war that is still occurring by obvious necessity do not write much; thus, primary source material from that side is difficult to come by. Of some assistance in this report was Sean MacStiofain's autobiographical work, Revolutionary in Ireland. Naturally, his biases must be taken into account, but propaganda aside, MacStiofain provided insight into the formative years of the Provisional IRA, the organizational mindset, strategy, and tactics. Finally, his perspective formed an interesting contrast to the more abundant pro-British, anti-terrorist literature. As Richard Clutterbuck, a well-known author of several works on terrorism to include Northern Ireland, observes in Guerrillas and Terrorists, "All those who write (on Northern Ireland) are, with varying degrees of passion, partisans of one side or the other." In the midst of Clutterbuck's substantial contributions to the literature and his numerous revealing insights, this concise observation is perhaps his moofound. In one brief sentence he describes the emotions, the biases, the polarity and distorted objectivity which confront the uninitiated researcher and leave him dazed and wandering like the legendary Irish traveler wading through a pasture of Ireland's mythical "sleepy grass."

A Change In Tactics? - The Urban Insurgent - First Lieutenant Robert Black, USAF. Air University Review article, January-February 1972. During the mid-morning hours of 8 October 1967, young Mario Teran, a Bolivian army sergeant, very hesitantly entered the back room of an old brick schoolhouse near the Yuro Canyon in southern Bolivia. A few seconds later, a burst of gunfire was heard, and then all was quiet. Inside the building lay the lifeless body of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. This killing not only was the culmination of an abortive eleven-month attempt aimed at a violent overthrow of the Bolivian government but also seemed to serve as a turning point in guerrilla theory.

The Muscatatuck Urban Training Center - The Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC) is developing to become a full-immersion contemporary urban operating environment. It will be a place where both civilian and military organizations can set the standards, improve the skills and test the systems and concepts to "Defend the Homeland" and "Win the Peace". MUTC is a small town with 70 buildings on 1,000 acres. Furnished infrastructure includes a water treatment plant, power house, 180 acre reservoir and an underground utility tunnel system that connects 90% of the buildings on the installation. This site has the capability to conduct doctrinal and non-doctrinal Department of Defense and Department of the Homeland Security events for more than 2,500 individuals. This joint training capability will achieve and sustain national preparedness through the conduct of systemic and periodic rehearsal of homeland security missions.

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