The School Shooter

The School Shooter
One Community's Experience
By William P. Heck, Ph.D.

Photograph of young boy holding a handgun © Don Ennis

In May 1998, the FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) began The School Shooter One 
Community’s Experience By William P. Heck, Ph.D. In researching 18 school shooting incidents to help identify 
relevant contributory and causal factors and to recommend procedures to school administrators and law 
enforcement agencies for threat assessment and intervention. In July 1999, the NCAVC sponsored a symposium 
on school shootings and threat assessment for the teachers and administrators from the 18 schools, along with a 
host of law enforcement, academic, and professional groups.1
Because of the rarity and uniqueness of school shooting incidents and the overall dynamics of adolescence, a 
usable profile of a “typical” school shooter simply does not exist. In fact, in its report, NCAVC concluded that 
“...when the incidence of any form of violence is very low and a very large number of people have identifiable risk 
factors, there is no reliable way to pick out from that large group the very few who will actually commit the violent 
act. At this time, there is no research that has identified traits and characteristics that can reliably distinguish 
school shooters from other students.”2
The NCAVC study also implies that improper responses to isolated incidents can compound the harm that already 
has occurred and might even set the stage for additional victimization. Schools across the nation have adopted 
zero-tolerance policies hoping that they will lessen the chances that a violent incident will occur. However, while 
such policies might prove useful in some situations, school administrators must use them with discretion and 
common sense; otherwise, a net-widening effect may result, which can place additional strain on students, 
teachers, parents, law enforcement, and the juvenile justice system.
An analysis of one incident that occurred in a middle school in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma, lends credence to 
NCAVC’s cautions insofar as the shooter seemed the least likely candidate for carrying out such violence. 
Moreover, critics have questioned the feasibility and suitability of a blanket zero-tolerance response adopted by 
the school administration in the wake of the shooting.
The Incident
As a high school student prepared to leave for school, she expected to face the same morning routine of rushing 
her 13-year-old brother to get ready for school. Although he always slept in and was rarely ready on time, that 
morning his sister surprisingly found him waiting at the bottom of the stairs and anxious to get to the middle school 
where he attended the seventh grade. She dropped her brother off at his school near the courtyard where 
students gathered each morning before class. After she left, the young boy took a few steps toward the school, 
put his backpack on the ground, and reached inside the pack to retrieve a fully loaded, 9-millimeter, 
semiautomatic pistol. Then, he walked across the school grounds, calmly shooting at his classmates. He 
continued to walk and shoot until the pistol was empty, creating a 90-foot primary crime scene and leaving five 
students wounded.
After emptying the pistol, he walked toward a breezeway where he complied with a teacher’s orders to put down the 
gun. Then, seemingly calm and emotionless, the boy said nothing as he waited for the police to arrive and place him
into custody. Although the tragedy ended a few short minutes after he fired the first shot, it might have lasted much 
longer had he kept his back pack, which contained enough ammunition for several reloads.
The Law Enforcement Response
Within minutes of receiving the 911 call, the chief of the Fort Gibson Police Department, along with other officers, 
arrived at the school. A teacher directed the officers to the area where another teacher was standing with the 
young shooter. When the chief asked the boy if anyone else with guns was in the school, his response, “No, I’m 
alone,” was one of the few statements he would make about the shooting.
At that point, the police did not know the number of casualties, only who had fired the shots. Fortunately, the 
emergency medical service and law enforcement response was immediate and professional. Ambulances 
responded quickly, and, within minutes, officers from a neighboring police department arrived to help secure the 
perimeter. Within a short period of time, a significant number of federal, state, and county law enforcement 
personnel had converged on the middle school to offer additional assistance.
The departments involved had conducted no advanced training or rehearsal for this type of incident. However, 
basic knowledge of crime scene processing and investigative protocol proved sufficient. As officers arrived on the 
scene, they approached the chief and awaited orders, allowing him to supervise and control the scene while 
dealing with the expected plethora of distractions.
Preserving the crime scene and securing witnesses proved difficult with the arrival of many concerned parents and 
the media. As school officials notified parents and the news spread, calls from other parents and from news 
agencies worldwide began to flood the police department. Fortunately, additional police dispatchers came to the 
station to help with the calls when they learned what had happened.
Within 1 hour of the incident, the department received more than 200 calls from the media. To manage the volume 
of inquiries on the incident, the chief assigned the deputy chief to control the crime scene, thus allowing himself to 
act as the official spokesperson for the department, helping quell rumors and speculation and providing factual 
information at numerous press conferences held that afternoon.3
The Investigation
Of the 15 shots fired by the young boy, 6 either hit or grazed their target. None of the shots proved fatal. Most of 
the victims sustained minor wounds to their arms or legs and only one required surgery. One of the victims found a 
bullet lodged in his algebra book, which he carried in his backpack during the assault.
The police accounted for each round the boy fired. Because many of the students dropped their books when they 
began to run, the police could more easily determine where many students stood when the assault began. The 
police roped off the primary crime scene and secured a secondary boundary outside that perimeter. Police spent 2 
days collecting evidence, reconstructing the boy’s actions, and guarding the crime scene until they completed the 
processing.

Photograph of a boy's hand holding a handgun by his side © Don Ennis

Police found the boy’s background of particular interest in this case. His social history does not fit the popular 
image of an aspiring psychotic killer. According to his certification study prepared by the Office of Juvenile Affairs 
several months after the shooting, neither he nor anyone in his family had any prior contact with the juvenile system
or law enforcement.
His parents both have college degrees and well paying jobs, enabling the family to live in a new home in a quiet 
neighborhood. The boy was active in Sunday school and in his church’s youth and mission programs and held 
above-average grades. He had no referrals in his disciplinary folder, and his teachers described him as a bright, 
well-behaved young man who got along well with his classmates. He liked to play on his computer, read books, and 
collect miniature military figures. In fact, he appeared as a model child with admirable aspirations to become a 
military officer.
After receiving consent from the parents to search his bedroom, on the surface, police found a “typical” teenaged-
boy’s bedroom consisting of an extensive collection of figurines and models. However, police did find a non typical 
collection of military books in his closet, and all of the games on his computer had a military motif as well.
The Certification Study
Ultimately, police charged the young shooter with six counts of shooting with intent to kill and one count of 
possessing a weapon on school property. Law enforcement and prosecutors had to address one primary question
—should the criminal justice system process the boy as an adult or a juvenile? Oklahoma law lists certain criteria 
courts must consider when determining whether to certify a juvenile offender as an adult.4
	• The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community, and whether the juvenile 
	committed the offense in aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner
	• Whether the juvenile committed the offense against persons or property, and, if 
	personal injury resulted, the degree of injury
	• The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile and the capability of distinguishing right 
	from wrong, determined by psychological evaluation; home search home environmental 
	situation; emotional attitude; and pattern of living
	• The record or previous history of the accused, including previous contacts with 
	community organizations, law enforcement agencies, schools, juvenile or criminal courts, 
	and other jurisdictions, as well as prior periods of probation or prior commitments to 
	juvenile institutions
	• The prospects for adequate protection of the public
	• The likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile if the courts find the juvenile 
	guilty of committing the alleged offense
	• Whether the juvenile committed the offense while escaping or in an escape status from 
	an institution for delinquent children
The crime in Fort Gibson was aggressive and violent. The boy’s actions, before and during the shooting, and the 
preparation involved strongly suggest a premeditated and willful crime. The boy committed the crime against other 
individuals, which resulted in serious injuries. Based on interviews with his family, friends, and school officials, 
juvenile officers concluded that he had the sophistication, maturity, and capability of distinguishing right from wrong.
Because he had no previous criminal record, a “clean” school file, and a positive demeanor, officials did not 
perceive him as a threat. The juvenile officer concluded that public safety could be assured if the boy was detained
in an institution for juvenile delinquents. Moreover, the juvenile officer concluded that if the courts processed him 
through the juvenile justice system, assuming his willingness to work toward identified treatment goals, rehabilitation
could be achieved.5
The aggregative result of the young boy’s violent act would determine his fate—there was only one serious injury 
and no deaths. Nevertheless, 6 out of 15 shots established intent to cause great bodily harm.
Moreover, one multiple hit, and a missed shot at a wounded victim, strongly indicated a specific intent to kill. Due to
the intent and the extreme violence of the act, the prosecution sought to have the boy certified as an adult and 
processed through the criminal justice system; yet, the courts decided that the juvenile system would provide a 
greater opportunity for understanding and rehabilitating him.
The Certification Hearing
During his certification hearing, physicians and psychiatrists for the defense and prosecution argued the boy ’s 
fate. In the process, a greater understanding of the contributory factors that led him to such violence emerged. 
Although he seemed to have a model life at home and at school, he suffered from recurrent severe headaches, for
which he took several prescription medicines and received treatment from a psychologist for 9 months prior to the 
shooting. In addition, 3 weeks before the shooting, he received an injection of a steroid to treat poison ivy. Three 
medical experts, who testified at the hearing, agreed that the steroid he received might produce psychotic effects 
on some users, such as depression and a psychotic breakdown. Considering the combined expert opinions 
offered, the board could not completely dismiss biological factors and chemical reactions as determinants of the 
violent behavior.
Furthermore, expert testimony revealed a potential motive stemming from the boy ’s own fantasy of becoming a 
general. A psychologist, who spent several hours interviewing him, testified that an obsession with military tactics 
and the desire to become a general might have actually served as motives for testing himself in a combat situation.
Another expert in psychiatry and neurology who also interviewed the boy shared this opinion and suggested that 
his migraines resulted from a self-induced pressure to make good grades and that his pain disorder had 
progressively worsened to a schizoid personality disorder resulting in his detachment from social relationships and 
restricted range of emotional expression. The experts concluded that, rather than being impulsive, the boy’s 
behavior during the shooting remained controlled, organized, and premeditated and that he experienced his first 
combat action during that shooting.
The board found the boy guilty on all charges, denied certification, and recommended placement in a state 
juvenile institution. The defense argued unsuccessfully that placement among the predominantly aggressive 
population in such an institution would prove detrimental to his treatment needs. Arguing for a more private 
therapeutic setting, the defense emphasized that this otherwise model student had committed a single abhorrent 
act. Nevertheless, after considering the testimony from experts on both sides and the seriousness of the crime, the
court concluded that he should receive “the most extreme treatment” available under this system. The prosecution 
argued that, if not certified, the boy may get released back into the community after only a few months because, 
under Oklahoma law, he can only remain incarcerated until his 19th birthday. Notwithstanding, the court assured 
that it would make additional stipulations before he could get an early release.
The School’s Response
Although it remains unlikely that school administrators could have foreseen or prevented this shooting, they still felt
considerable pressure to reassure the community that they would take some decisive action to ensure that similar 
violence would not happens again. In a form letter sent to parents, the school superintendent announced a new 
policy that could prevent violence by suppressing certain gestures, such as pointing a finger at another person 
and pretending to shoot, or making comments, such as “You’re dead,” “I could just kill you for that,” “You are the 
reason students bring guns to school and shoot teachers,” or “Someone should take a bomb and blow this place 
up.
Further, the school superintendent suggested that school officials would no longer consider certain words and 
gestures merely figures of speech and that they would take formal action against any student who used them. 
Some examples of such formal actions could include filing police reports on students making such threats or 
comments, suspending students who use such threats or comments, requesting psychological evaluations to 
determine the current mental status of students making threats, or requiring students to begin counseling upon or 
before returning to school.
Since the policy went into effect, the Fort Gibson Police Department records reveal numerous reports filed on 
several students. When the department receives a call from the school, an officer brings the student back to the 
department, notifies the parents and the Office of Juvenile Affairs, and turns the child over to a juvenile officer. 
Fort Gibson police call records show that since the shooting, officers spend considerably more time at the school.
Ironically, the young shooter did not use any of the forbidden phrases or gestures that now would cause his 
apprehension and suspension. He was a mannerly, quiet, seventh-grade student whose obsession, in combination
with other unknown factors, led him to commit a horribly violent act.

Conclusion
While the Fort Gibson shooting proved quite enigmatic and troubling to the small community, it clearly reinforced the
findings of the most recent, indepth research on school violence—no one can predict when, where, or by whom 
such violence may be committed. Consequently, it remains difficult to formulate a meaningful preventive 
response to school shootings or to develop a profile of a likely shooter. While the urge to act quickly remains 
overwhelming, it may compound the harm done and prolong the recovery.
Undoubtedly, experts must analyze carefully violent incidents occurring in schools to better identify and handle 
relevant causes and contributing factors. However, communities must give strong consideration to potential 
problems that might emerge in the aftermath. Specifically, authorities should give priority to restoring order in the 
affected school and providing students with sufficient time and resources to resolve their own emotions and put the 
incident behind them. Establishing irrelevant rules and taking formal action against children for minor indiscretions 
will do little more than prolong the healing process by further victimizing the students. In the end, the violence will 
still have occurred, and the official reaction will have encouraged a general sense of injustice and a loss of respect 
for authority.
What can be done? The law enforcement community has joined together to develop techniques for responding to 
school shootings. Officers, many of whom are parents, have witnessed more than enough of these tragedies and 
know firsthand that such wanton acts of violence must be prevented. In order to do so, police, schools, and 
communities must work together to develop plausible strategies that identify those youngsters teetering on the brink
of violent outbreaks and provide meaningful, timely intervention.
Endnotes
1 For additional information, see, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, 2000,” (Washington, DC, 2000); http://www.fbi.gov; accessed March 14, 2001.
2 Ibid, 3.
3 For additional information on handling media inquiries, see, James L. Vance, “Media Interviews: A Systematic Approach for Success,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin; February 1997, 1-7.
4 Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3
5 State of Oklahoma, Office of Juvenile Affairs, Certification Study for Seth Trickey, March 22, 2000, 5. Dr. Heck is an associate professor of criminal 
justice at Northeastern State University in Tahlequah, Oklahoma.

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