3000
TTECG
UWTC/pek
2 Oct 05

From: Director, Urban Warfare Training Cadre, Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG)
To: G-3T, II Marine Expeditionary Force
Subj: IRAQ TRAINING ASSESSMENT TRIP REPORT

1. The following report summarizes my recent training assessment trip to Iraq during July. All topics listed below were identified by the various units/ individuals from the perspective of what topics/events frequently dealt with in Iraq should be incorporated into the Urban Warfare predeployment training program.

2. Executive Summary.

a. Units contacted; RCT-8, RCT-2, CLR-25, 3/4, 3/8. CLB-8, 3/25 (limited/very brief), AAVs. Individuals from Lance Corporal to Colonel, infantry and non-infantry, staff and line unit were interviewed over a period of six days.
b. Comment trend was that the program was relevant, realistic and taught the basics for the unit to build on no matter if infantry or non-infantry and regardless of AO.
c. Heard many recoms we have already incorporated into the training program (units interviewed went through the program Oct - Dec '04). Also took away many recoms for new scenarios to add to the FEX and/or areas to emphasize during the training program (reporting, EoF were most often mentioned).
d. I have a much greater understanding of AO tactical and cultural particulars/differences that will make the training program even more accurate/relevant. I got more out of these 5 days than I got out of 6 months reading the SIPR. Staying connected on SIPR and with returning units is still important. This trip served as first-hand confirmation of the training program as well as direct feedback for improvements.
e. Use of Titan linguists is a significant benefit to the effectiveness of the program. Several units said that is where they developed their understanding/ appreciation of the cultural, and that including them in the FEX and small unit lane training made for sound learning progression which started with home station and/or CAOCL training.
f. Heard several unsolicited, positive comments about the value of RCAX too.
g. Traveling initially with PDSS to get there was beneficial, but could have used several more days to get to Ramadi and Al Quaim/Haditha. Need at least 12 days due to travel time and unexpected aircraft/convoy delays.
h. Got great support from everyone I met or had to deal with (Cmdrs/ Staffs/ flight line/ UMCCs).
i. Recom AO visits continue under TTECG oversight / MEF control every 6 months to ensure pre-deployment training programs maintain relevancy/ accuracy and strong relations with MarDiv/FSSG units.

3. 3/4 experienced good relations with ISF; ISF steadily becoming more reliable. They recommend including FID type training in the program (3/4 did not get to complete the FEX due to accelerated deployment. Greater emphasis on FID type training started in Feb; we will continue to build larger role player ISF.)

4. Companies are doing a great job generating intel tips from the locals/actionable intelligence. Often they are in a better position than HHQ in getting the intel. (Continue to develop and weave intel picture into the RIP/ Road to War documents, as well as planting intel at various FEX events so that they can lead to company or battalion size operations.)

5. EoF, ROE and Detainee Handling is better trained to standard at the Urban Warfare training program than at home station due to realistic scenarios and role players. (Develop greater emphasis during FEX, especially review of detainee paperwork.)

6. EoF at VCPs is critical skill and needs extra attention during pre-deployment training. (Urban Warfare instructors need to stay closely connected to the deployed units and to receive from theater, and incorporate into training the latest TTPs. SIPR connectivity will prove beneficial if there continues to be a dedicated ‘latest TTP/ lessons learned’ type folder.)

7. Recommend Bns get and bring their attachments to pre-deployment training, or the UWTC/Bn simulate them during Urban Warfare training IOT better exercise the staff with integrating their skills. Recommend fully integrating HET and RadBn during pre-deployment training. (Best to have units arrive with attachments to maximize accuracy and correct TTPs. UWTC to seek out capabilities/SOP type briefs from HET, EOD, RadBn, etc.)

8. Recommend fully integrating digital camera and voice recorders into training. (Recommend units consider purchasing their own to fully develop SOPs throughout predeployment training. UWTC will purchase several for units’ immediate use.)

9. Recommend working the COC during Urban Operations lane training with intel updates, FRAGOs, etc to develop the COP and target folders. (We can do this; the future Mojave Viper will even include intel injects during small unit lane training.)

10. Expand the hospitals role during training since occasionally insurgents are sending their wounded there for treatment and can be collected and detained. (Can do.)

11. Units with standardized, well-understood house and vehicle search SOPs that are consistently followed are more successful at finding contraband. (Will add to classes more details of searches and will continue to develop more realistic search houses to better develop the routine.)

12. Recommend creating many more elaborate MSELs to reinforce sensitive site exploitation and test a unit’s ability to piece information together to develop actionable intelligence. (See #9 above.)

a. Discreet seizure of cell phones/ computers may lead to better intel, if totally unknown to the local. (Will add to instruction and seek out the training aids.)
b. Leaving a hidden voice recorder at a cordon and knock site and then coming back 30 minutes later to retrieve it. (Will implement.)

13. Recommend fully integrating emerging technologies into the Urban Operations training program, such as but not limited to, Gunpowder/ Gunshot Residue Kits, Backscatter, OPAL, BATS, UOC, ICE systems, Scan Eagle, Dragoneye, BFT etc. (Much will be added to the Mojave Viper training program when we integrate with TTECG in Sep ’05.)

14. Recommend building our RIP pattern/trend analysis graphics to include background info on each of the ‘hits’ to help units to piece information together to develop actionable intelligence. (UWTC will continue to develop more elaborate/ comprehensive scenarios and RIP briefs and documents.)

15. Recommend placing more emphasis on reporting up to Regt, getting the 5Ws quickly and accurately, timely updates to sigevent reports, Watch Officer’s supervising and enforcing proper reporting and formats, especially patrol reports. Practice electronic reporting, documenting, sharing battle drills to ensure the entire watch knows what to do with electronic reports. (Have placed much greater emphasis starting Feb 05 when we added the Battle Update Brief to the FEX to require units to submit a variety of written reports. We also need MEF/MarDiv to specify particular reporting procedures and formats.)

16. Recommend adding more close quarter shoot/ no-shoot drills in the urban environment as well as return fire drills after SAF/IED attacks. (Can add to Urban Assault lane.)

17. Concerning IEDs;

a. Roadside workers still a concern.
b. Cinder block IEDs.
c. Surface laid, simple IEDs are prevalent in Karmah.
d. CLR-25 mentioned increase in booby-trapped triggering devices/ base stations, as well as, decoy/hidden IEDs and secondary IEDs to get responders, EOD, Corpsman etc. (Will focus effort on improving IED awareness, defeat and deny instruction and training.)

18. Recommend MSELs that draw out identifying signs of intimidation and then enable the unit to counter them with stay behind ambushes etc. (Can do.)

19. Recommend adding MSELs where ISF/POB abuse detainees/ locals, recon by fire and/or respond too aggressively after SAF/IED attack to condition Marines to this potential friction point. (Can do.)

20. Recommend adding a MSEL that requires Bns to stay out of the way or support SOF action within the Bn’s AO with only 3-6 hours notice. (Can do.)

21. Recommend we get in touch with State Dept IP liaisons to incorporate/improve Police Assist Team training. (Will discuss with TTECG to determine if feasible, supportable.)

22. Recommend re-instating driver training at pre-deployment training; UAH and MTVR handling and black-out driving. (Will address to TTECG chain of command and make determination if feasible, safe, supportable.)

23. Continue teaching the importance of connecting with the Iraqi local community, especially along MSRs, to develop trust and improve force protection/ early warning of nearby IEDs or hazards.

24. A combination of overt and covert VCPs works best. (Will add to Bn COC class and VCP class.

a. Establish covert VCPs on the outskirts of villages IOT catch fleeing insurgents.
b. Establish VCPs on routes that are parallel to MSRs to catch those watching and/or moving ahead/behind to set IEDs.
c. Include Mounted and Directed VCP techniques.

25. CO, ? Co, 3rd AAV identified several of the most important pre-deployment training areas. (Will discuss with TTECG to determine if this training is feasible at 29 Palms, and will incorporate into the Mech – Infantry Integration Instruction.)

a. Close quarters/ quick reaction firing with the MK19 and M2 at approx 150 meters.
b. Use the MK19 to isolate an objective and block insurgent ingress/egress.
c. Infantry – Tracker integration, mainly at the staff level (capabilities, limitations, ammo/fuel/ repair parts consumption rates).
d. Vehicle Self recovery drills.

26. Several Non-Inf units stressed M240G training for all hands. (Will discuss with TTECG to determine if this training is feasible during the Combined Arms portion of Mojave Viper.) 

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