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Introduction The Germans believe that specially trained mountain troops (Gebirgystruppen) may influence decisively tile outcome of a campaign, for mass armies must rely on specially trained small forces to secure their advance through the broader mountain valleys in order to reach the flat, where the decision usually is sought. Small forces of mountain troops can prevent, impede, harass, or channel the movements of the main enemy force through the valleys, so that when the decisive battle takes place in the flat, the enemy's power is spent and he is compelled to fight under the most unfavorable conditions. When on the offensive, mountain troops can cover and protect the advance of their own main force, enabling it to reach terrain of its own choice in the highest state of readiness for combat. Thus their mission on the offensive is to secure the route for the advance of large units through the valleys, whereas their mission on the defensive is to deny the valleys to the mass of the enemy forces. In either case, mountain troops must gain control of the mountains. The Germans hold that the basic tactics of warfare in mountains are the same as in the flat, but that the application of the principles must be modified to fit the high and rugged terrain. In mountainous terrain the movement of troops and the employment of heavy equipment are limited, and deployment is restricted to such an extent that only comparatively small forces can operate. Soldiers must be prepared to advance over narrow roads, tortuous paths, trackless terrain, steep and slippery slopes, ravines, precipices, and glaciers. Movement frequently is threatened by avalanches, rockfalls, landslides, and cornice fractures. Besides these special terrain factors, the weather also exerts a great influence on mountain fighting. Meteorological phenomena, such as burning sun, heavy rain, and blinding snow coupled with intense cold, may occur in swift sequences. In mountains, the Germans believe, the infantry-artillery team retains the ascendancy which on other fields of battle it yields in part to armor and air power. Relatively unimportant roles are played in mountain warfare by the tank and the airplane. The employment of heavy infantry weapons and artillery is hampered by their bulk and weight, by the considerable (lead space, and by the difficulties of observation due to weather and intervening terrain features. It is the infantry, above all, that must bear the brunt of the battle. Consequently, the Germans stress the principle that the importance of shock action and close combat increases as the efficiency of other methods of fighting decreases, and that in some respects mountain fighting resembles guerrilla warfare. Because of the narrow terrain compartments in mountains, unified control is possible only over small units. The Germans believe that the reinforced battalion is ordinarily the largest tactical unit whose movements a commander can effectively control during combat. In unusually rugged terrain the task unit must be even smaller. Therefore, greater responsibility is placed on officers of lower rank. The focal points of mountain combat are the heights. Gun emplacements and observation posts on commanding heights can dominate the foreground and valley, making the task of the advancing infantry relatively easy. But of all mountain operations the seizure of heights is the most difficult. A well-defended height must be taken by surprise to avoid great losses. Only men skilled in mountaineering, who have developed stamina through long conditioning, who have the ability to maintain direction, and who have been thoroughly trained for combat, can effectively carry through an attack on a height in high mountains. This is a cardinal principle of mountain warfare which the Germans emphasize. The following is a summary of basic characteristics of mountain warfare which are stressed in training by the Germans: (1) Movement is much slower than in the flat, for it takes a long time to bring troops into position. Artillery and heavy weapons, particularly, move slowly. The deployment of infantry, especially units with heavy weapons, requires much time. The attack itself proceeds slowly, and the terrain prevents it from gaining the momentum that is possible in the flat; on the other hand, the large number of good defensive positions and the scarcity of roads facilitate delaying actions. Reserves have to be held very close to the front lines; otherwise, unpredictable conditions of terrain and weather may delay their arrival for the crucial phase of battle. (2) Signal communication is less reliable than in the flat. The weather sometimes weakens the audibility of messages transmitted by wire or radio. Radio is faster than wire communication, but even less reliable. Reception may be affected by the weather and by the configuration of the mountains. Laying lines is a slow, arduous process and maintenance and servicing of wire are difficult. Control of the battle by the higher commander is limited largely to a preconceived and thorough plan, since the uncertain channels of signal communication usually prevent him from intervening effectively in operations once the battle has begun. Consequently, the responsibility of subordinate commanders for independent action is greater than in the flat. Rarely can they expect aid from reserves, as the full force is likely to be committed all at once. (3) The problem of supply becomes extremely acute in mountains, and the proportion of supply troops to combat troops increases. Supply routes are few; food, forage, and ammunition must be carried over narrow roads and mountain trails as far as possible by motor transport, then on mules and mountain horses, and finally on the backs of the soldiers. Economy of supplies is necessary because the danger of extending a unit beyond reach of its supply column is great, and, furthermore, it is impossible for an over-extended unit to live off the country in mountains. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Section I. GERMAN DOCTRINE OF MOUNTAIN WARFARE 1. COMBAT IN HIGH MOUNTAINS a. General b. Command c. Effect on Firing 2. RECONNAISSANCE 3. MARCHING; SECURITY; SHELTER a. Marches (1) General (2) Order of march (3) Time factors (4) March discipline b. Security c. Shelter 4. COMBAT a. General b. Attack (1) Advance and deployment (2) Effect of terrain (3) Types of attack e. Defense and Withdrawal 5. MOTORIZED AND MECHANIZED OPERATIONS 6. AIR OPERATIONS 7. MOUNTAIN INFANTRY a. Mountain Rifle Company (1) Squad (2) Platoon (3) Company b. Mountain Machine-gun Company (1) General (2) Marches and reconnaissance (3) Employment in combat c. Mountain Infantry Battalion d. Mountain Antitank Company 8. MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY a. General b. Reconnaissance and Observation c. Marches d. Employment in Combat 9. MOUNTAIN ENGINEERS a. Missions b. Employment in Combat 10. MOUNTAIN SIGNAL AND COMMUNICATION TROOPS a. Missions b. Marches c. Employment in Combat d. Technical Considerations (1) Wire communication (2) Radio communication (3) Visual signal communication 11. MOUNTAIN SERVICES a. Mountain Medical Service b. Mountain Veterinary Service c. Mountain Supply Section II. TRAINING 12. GENERAL 13. INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING 14. MOUNTAINEERING a. General b. Scale of Requirements c. Technique (I) Marching (2) Climbing (3) Special climbing equipment d. Bivouacs e. Self-preservation; Orientation Section III. ARMY MOUNTAIN GUIDES 15. GENERAL 16. GUIDE TRAINING 17. MISSIONS OF GUIDES Section IV. CLOTHING, IDENTIFICATION, INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT 18. CLOTHING 19. IDENTIFICATION 20. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT 21. FOOD Section V. ORGANIZATION; ARMAMENT; EQUIPMENT 22. GENERAL 23. MOUNTAIN INFANTRY REGCIMENT 24. MOUNTAIN INFANTRY BATTALION 25. HEAVY-WEAPONS COMPANY 26. REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANY 27. M'OUNTAIN ANTITANK BATTALION 28. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION 29. MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY REGIMENT 30. MOUNTAIN ENGINEER BATTALION 31. MOUNTAIN SIGNAL BATTALION 32. MOUNTAIN SERVICES 33. REPLACEMENT BATTALION Appendix. FIRING IN MOUNTAINS 34. PECULIARITIES OF FIRING 35. GRAPHIC FIRING TABLEs 36. USE of THE GRAPHIC FIRING TABLE a. Determining Trajectory Values (1) Charge and elevation (2) Masks b. Angle of Fall; Angle of Impact c. Time of Flight; Drift; Fuse-setting d. Dispersion e. Metro Data and Masks f. Location of a Gun Position g. Special Firing Precautions End of Preview.
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