This book is included in the US Intelligence Agencies, Security Organizations & Threat Assessments section.
The Strategic Studies Institute FOREWORD This monograph comes at a time when the U.S. and Venezuelan governments are intensifying an ongoing series of acrimonious charges and countercharges. Each country has argued repeatedly that the other is engaged in a political-economic-military struggle for Western Hemisphere hegemony. On a more personal level, the United States maintains that President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela is playing a destabilizing role in the region, and is compromising the quality of democracy and the exercise of power in Venezuela and other parts of the Americas. Chávez rebuts that the only destabilizing factor in the hemisphere is President George W. Bush, and that democracy and power long since have been perverted by American capitalists and local elites for their own purposes. And the U.S.-Venezuelan verbal sparing match continues unabated. The author’s intent is to explain who Hugo Chávez is, where it appears that he is going, and how he intends to get there; and the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America. He concludes that—in the worst case— Chávez is developing the conceptual and physical bases for an asymmetric “Super Insurgency.” This timely monograph contributes significantly to an understanding of the new kinds of threats characteristic of a world in which instability and irregular conflict are no longer on the margins of global politics. For those responsible for making and implementing national security policy in the United States, the rest of the Western Hemisphere, and elsewhere in the world, this analysis is compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security and stability. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute Summary The author of this monograph answers questions regarding “Who is Hugo Chávez?” “What is the basis of Chávez’s bolivarianismo?” “What is the context that defines Bolivarian threats?” “How does Chávez define contemporary asymmetric warfare, and what are the key components of success?” “How can the innumerable charges and countercharges between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments be interpreted?” And “What are the implications for democracy and stability in Latin America?” His conclusions are, first, that Hugo Chávez might be a military caudillo, but he is no “nut case.” He is, in fact, what Ralph Peters calls a “wise competitor.” Second, as such, he will not even attempt to defeat his enemies on their own terms. Rather, he will seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and turn to nontraditional forms of assault on a nation’s stability and integrity. Third, as a consequence, it is important to understand that Chávez understands that every player in the international community from small powers to the U.S. superpower must cope simultaneously with four levels of contemporary threat. Accordingly, all the types of threats in those four levels of conflict are seen as methods of choice—or areas for exploitation—for any commercial, ideological, or other movement that is dedicated to achieving control or radical change in a given nation-state. Fourth, Chávez understands that asymmetric warfare is the methodology of the weak against the strong. He understands that this type of conflict requires more than weaponry and technology. It requires lucid and incisive thinking, resourcefulness, determination, imagination, and a certain disregard for convention. Chávez considers three issues to be key to success (or failure) in contemporary asymmetric conflict. They are closely related to bolivarianismo’s security scheme, social programs, and communications efforts. In these terms, he understands the sophistication and complexity of war as a whole. He also understands the value of facilitating the processes of state failure to achieve his objectives of establishing socialism for the 21st century, economic and political integration, and Latin American grandeza (greatness). And Chávez understands the centrality of relative moral legitimacy in conflict —and the critical importance of creating popular perceptions that his cause is morally correct, and will lead to a better life for all. Finally, taken all together, this is “war as a whole,” or what Chávez calls “Guerra de todo el pueblo” (interchangeably: war of all the people, asymmetric, fourth-generation, or irregular war). At a minimum, Chávez and Venezuela are developing the conceptual and physical capability to challenge the status quo in Latin America, and to generate a “Super Insurgency” intended to bring about fundamental political and economic change in the region. Thus, as one sees Chávez’s ideas developing and maturing, it is becoming more and more obvious that his bolivarianismo is resonating with large numbers of people in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America—and that he should not be taken lightly. This is the starting point from which to understand where Chávez may be going and how he expects to get there. And it is the starting point from which to understand the side effects that will shape the hemispheric security environment now and for the future. The consequences of failing to take this challenge seriously are clear. Unless thinking, actions, and organization are reoriented at the highest levels to deal with contemporary asymmetric realities, the problems of global, regional, and subregional democracy, stability, and security will resolve themselves —and not likely for the better. CONTENTS Foreword Biographical Sketch of the Author Summary Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare The Political-Historical Context within which Venezuelan National Security Choices are made and Implemented Caudillos (Strong Men) Period from World War II and the Venezuelan Commitment to Democracy. Post-1992 “Crisis of Governance” and Two Related Security Issues. Globalization and Fractured Society. Governance and the Role of the Armed Forces. Conclusions on the Political-Historical Context in which Venezuelan Security Policy is Generated. Chavez’s Concept of 21st Century Socialism and How to Achieve It Key Concepts of the “New” Socialism. Major Implementing Programs for the “New” Socialism. Social Programs. Communications. The Security Scheme. Conclusions Regarding Chávez’s Model for the Achievement of a “New” Socialism. The Venezuelan and Hemispheric Stability Security Problem: A Levels of Analysis Approach Perspectives on a Full Spectrum of Threats within the Venezuelan and Latin American Security Environment. The First Level. The Second Level. The Third Level. The Fourth Level. Conclusions from the Four Levels of Analysis. Some Final Thoughts on Chavez’s Asymmetrical Conflict as a Challenge to Hemispheric Security The Sophistication and Complexity of War as a Whole. The Issue of State Failure. The Centrality of Moral Legitimacy in Contemporary Conflict. Conclusions Recommendations Endnotes End of Preview.
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