This book is included in the US Intelligence Agencies, Security Organizations & Threat Assessments section.
Abstract Current Special Forces doctrine is very limited concerning the conduct of guerrilla warfare combat operations in urban environments. The focus of the current doctrine is on conducting combat operations in rural environments. The material available on urban environments is defined in broad terms primarily focused on the larger picture of unconventional warfare. Some considerations and characteristics of urban tactical operations are addressed but are so general they could be applied to a conventional infantry unit as easily as to a guerrilla force. Traditionally, Special Forces guerrilla warfare doctrine has focused on its conduct in a rural environment as historically, most guerrilla movements have formed, operated, and been supported outside of the cities. Increasing world urbanization is driving the “center of gravity” of the resistance, the populace and their will to resist, into urban settings. As populations have gravitated to the cities on every continent, the ability to prosecute a successful guerrilla war has often depended on the ability to conduct combat operations in these environments. Predominantly, the aspects of unconventional warfare that were executed in urban settings were those such as intelligence activities, recruiting, sabotage, or subversion. Guerrilla warfare combat operations were done in urban environments only when absolutely necessary. Introduction The topic of this thesis is “Guerrilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments.” It examines the tactics and techniques used in combat operations by various guerrilla forces in urban environments. Although traditional guerrilla warfare has been primarily a rural endeavor, as populations have gravitated to the cities on every continent the ability to prosecute a successful guerrilla war has often depended on the ability to conduct combat operations in these environments. However, the question remains whether Special Forces doctrine has kept up with this phenomenon by addressing the employment of guerrilla forces in combat operations in urban environments. Urban guerrilla warfare is not a new idea, and has been primarily a means to support, draw attention away from, or accompany the primary guerrilla forces operating in the rural areas. As a result, the historical actions of guerrillas that were predominantly executed in urban settings, and thus addressed in Special Forces doctrine, were those such as intelligence activities, recruiting, sabotage, or subversion. No doubt these activities should continue to be utilized in this fashion in the future when applicable. Little focus has been given to guerrilla warfare combat operations in urban environments as they were conducted only when absolutely necessary due to the inherent risks of attacking military or police forces in the cities. However, the end of the twentieth century has shown a significant increase in urban guerrilla warfare combat operations throughout the world, most often as a necessary means to prosecute the war. The guerrilla survives and succeeds by his dependence upon the populace and their support of his actions. In many areas of the world, and most often in the least developed countries, the populace has increasingly moved into and around the cities as the communities have shifted from rural-based to urban-based societies (Taw 1994). The guerrilla must do the same if he is to gain their material and moral support. If the guerrillas of a US-sponsored insurgency have been forced closer to or within urban areas to accomplish their mission then Special Forces units must be prepared to organize, train, advise, assist, and employ them in the conduct of guerrilla combat operations in the cities. This thesis will focus on guerrilla warfare combat operations (ambush, raid, and sniper operations) conducted in urban environments. Ancillary activities such as reconnaissance, collaboration with the populace, and command and control will be addressed as they pertain to the guerrillas’ accomplishment of their combat operations. It will not be addressing intelligence activities, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla logistical support and/or caching, training, or basing considerations. All of these areas are certainly important aspects of a successful guerrilla war and some have significant tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for urban environments already established in doctrine. Specified TTP for the employment of guerilla forces in urban combat operations is more difficult to find. Another limitation of the scope of this thesis will be the use of only certain historical examples. This thesis will research the tactics of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from 1969 to the present, the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation on Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, and Chechen rebels during the Battles for Grozny in 1994 and 2000. These case studies were chosen for their relatively modern time frames, which allowed for more availability of resources detailing the tactics used, and their particularly different aspects of urban guerrilla warfare. The IRA operate in essentially peacetime conditions and almost completely covertly, rarely taking up direct combat with the British military or security forces. The Mujahideen lived and operated primarily in rural areas, and moved into the cities to conduct specific combat operations as their needs called for. The Chechens lived, operated, and fought within Grozny and were in near constant violent contact with the Russians. The primary question that will be answered by this thesis is Does the current Special Forces doctrine for guerrilla warfare combat operations TTP need modifications or additions for application in urban environments? Several secondary questions must then be addressed. What historical examples of guerrilla warfare have significant urban combat activities? How is the effectiveness of urban guerrilla warfare combat operations TTP measured? What legal considerations would prevent US Special Forces from using some of the tactics researched? Tertiary questions that will follow include: What are the current guerrilla warfare combat operations TTP found in Special Forces doctrine? What urban combat operations TTP were used in the researched historical examples? Were they successful? How did they differ from established TTP for guerrilla combat operations in current Special Forces doctrine? Should they be included in Special Forces doctrine for guerrilla warfare? Why? These secondary and tertiary questions support the primary question by establishing what is documented now, what others have done before, and what made them successful or unsuccessful. This thesis assumed the historical references used were factual and accurate. To ensure this, as many different references as possible of the same historical example were used and any examples with significant factual differences between references were discarded. This thesis uses several key terms throughout. The primary terms used are unconventional warfare, urban areas, combat operations, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. Unconventional warfare (UW) is defined as “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominately conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery” (DA 2001a, 2-1). Urban area is defined as “a concentration of structures, facilities, and people that form the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area” (DA 2002a, 1-2). Combat operations are defined as the offensive actions of raid, ambush, and sniper activities in which guerrilla forces use direct and indirect fire to engage enemy forces. An insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict” (DoD 2001, 215). Guerrilla warfare is defined as “military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominately indigenous forces against superior forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency” (DA 2001b, 1-1). A resistance organization of an insurgency is usually composed of three elements: the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. This thesis will focus on the operations of the guerrilla force, the overt military or paramilitary arm of the insurgency. The auxiliary, which supplies and supports the insurgency, and the underground, which conducts the above mentioned sabotage, subversion, and intelligence gathering activities, will be addressed only in their direct support of guerrilla combat operations. Subversion and sabotage must also be defined because the two activities are so often linked to insurgencies in general they are incorrectly thought to fall under the heading of guerrilla warfare. Subversion and sabotage, combined with guerrilla warfare and other activities, are aspects of the Unconventional Warfare mission, as defined above. Subversion “undermines the political, military, economic, or psychological strength of a nation or occupying power. Subversion attacks the internal or international legitimacy of targeted governments or powers and their actions” (DA 2001a, 2-8). Sabotage “injures or obstructs the national defense of a nation by willfully damaging or destroying any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, including human and natural resources” (DA 2001a, 2-9). These two activities are predominately carried out by the underground arm of an insurgency and not the guerrilla force. The terms “urban guerrilla warfare” and “terrorism” are often used interchangeably. To ensure a delineation between the two, terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (DoD 2001, 437). Two predominant problems were associated with the research and compilation of this thesis. The first was gaining accurate accounts and descriptions of the actual tactics used by guerrilla forces in their urban combat operations. The second was determining the literal success and usefulness of those tactics. The first problem required getting past the broad analysis of what the researched combat operations did and discovering how they executed the operations to the greatest detail possible. This involved background reading concerning the general topic of urban guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a popular subject for authors, either in general or concerning a specific case. Most focus on “what” the guerrillas did, and “why” they did it. Few get into the details of “how” they conducted their operations. Additionally, the case studies examined did not have direct US involvement. The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) has produced several works concerning the Afghan and Chechen case studies and the primary authors were available for further research and direction to alternate sources of information. To bridge this gap between broad analysis and actual tactics with the IRA case study, interviews were conducted with British officers who have served multiple tours in Northern Ireland. The second problem required establishing the conditions in which the combat operations were done and what aspects of those conditions were critical to their success. To determine the success or failure of various TTP used in urban guerrilla warfare combat operations requires an understanding of the overall goals and objectives of the particular insurgents being studied. The context of the actions taken must be considered in order to formulate and evaluate measures of effective urban guerrilla combat operations. This involved establishing specific criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of the TTP used in the researched combat operations. The criteria must span three subjects in order to evaluate the current Special Forces TTP for guerrilla combat operations and the TTP used in the historical examples. The first area that must be applied to the criteria is that of urban operations characteristics. “Collateral damage to local populace or facilities” would be an example of this criterion. The second subject area includes the principles of guerrilla warfare, such as “security.” The final subject area is that of legal considerations. Urban guerrillas have often employed significant unconventional tactics in order to surprise and deceive enemy forces. Some of these tactics tread a thin line between legal and illegal actions when applied against US national and international laws. An example is the use of civilian noncombatants for deception operations. Each criterion will be defined and further broken down into more detailed aspects for evaluation. CONTENTS THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ABSTRACT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ACRONYMS CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 4. ANALYSIS 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCE LIST INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT End of Preview.
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