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The Crowd
A Study of the Popular Mind

By Gustave LeBon
157 pages 1896

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This book is included in the Unexplained Shortages & The End Of The World As We Know It section.

xx 

PREFACE
The following work is devoted to an account of the characteristics of crowds.

The whole of the common characteristics with which heredity endows the individuals of a race constitute the genius
of the race. When, however, a certain number of these individuals are gathered together in a crowd for purposes of
action, observation proves that, from the mere fact of their being assembled, there result certain new psychological
characteristics, which are added to the racial characteristics and differ from them at times to a very considerable 
degree.

Organised crowds have always played an important part in the life of peoples, but this part has never been of such
moment as at present. The substitution of the unconscious action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals 
is one of the principal characteristics of the present age.

I have endeavoured to examine the difficult problem presented by crowds in a purely scientific manner—that is, by 
making an effort to proceed with method, and without being influenced by opinions, theories, and doctrines. This, I
believe, is the only mode of arriving at the discovery of some few particles of truth, especially when dealing, as is 
the case here, with a question that is the subject of impassioned controversy. A man of science bent on verifying a
phenomenon is not called upon to concern himself with the interests his verifications may hurt. In a recent
publication an eminent thinker, M. Goblet d'Alviela, made the remark that, belonging to none of the contemporary 
schools, I am occasionally found in opposition of sundry of the conclusions of all of them. I hope this new work will 
merit a similar observation. To belong to a school is necessarily to espouse its prejudices and preconceived 
opinions.

Still I should explain to the reader why he will find me draw conclusions from my investigations which it might be 
thought at first sight they do not bear; why, for instance, after noting the extreme mental inferiority of crowds, 
picked assemblies included, I yet affirm it would be dangerous to meddle with their organisation, notwithstanding 
this inferiority.

The reason is, that the most attentive observation of the facts of history has invariably demonstrated to me that 
social organisms being every whit as complicated as those of all beings, it is in no wise in our power to force them 
to undergo on a sudden far-reaching transformations. Nature has recourse at times to radical measures, but never
after our fashion, which explains how it is that nothing is more fatal to a people than the mania for great reforms, 
however excellent these reforms may appear theoretically. They would only be useful were it possible to change 
instantaneously the genius of nations. This power, however, is only possessed by time. Men are ruled by ideas, 
sentiments, and customs—matters which are of the essence of ourselves. Institutions and laws are the outward 
manifestation of our character, the expression of its needs. Being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change 
this character.

The study of social phenomena cannot be separated from that of the peoples among whom they have come into 
existence. From the philosophic point of view these phenomena may have an absolute value; in practice they have 
only a relative value.

It is necessary, in consequence, when studying a social phenomenon, to consider it successively under two very 
different aspects. It will then be seen that the teachings of pure reason are very often contrary to those of practical
reason. There are scarcely any data, even physical, to which this distinction is not applicable. From the point of 
view of absolute truth a cube or a circle are invariable geometrical figures, rigorously defined by certain formulas. 
From the point of view of the impression they make on our eye these geometrical figures may assume very varied
shapes. By perspective the cube may be transformed into a pyramid or a square, the circle into an ellipse or a 
straight line. Moreover, the consideration of these fictitious shapes is far more important than that of the real 
shapes, for it is they and they alone that we see and that can be reproduced by photography or in pictures. In 
certain cases there is more truth in the unreal than in the real. To present objects with their exact geometrical
forms would be to distort nature and render it unrecognisable. If we imagine a world whose inhabitants could only
copy or photograph objects, but were unable to touch them, it would be very difficult for such persons to attain to 
an exact idea of their form. Moreover, the knowledge of this form, accessible only to a small number of learned 
men, would present but a very minor interest.

The philosopher who studies social phenomena should bear in mind that side by side with their theoretical value 
they possess a practical value, and that this latter, so far as the evolution of civilisation is concerned, is alone of 
importance. The recognition of this fact should render him very circumspect with regard to the conclusions that 
logic would seem at first to enforce upon him.

There are other motives that dictate to him a like reserve. The complexity of social facts is such, that it is 
impossible to grasp them as a whole and to foresee the effects of their reciprocal influence. It seems, too, that 
behind the visible facts are hidden at times thousands of invisible causes. Visible social phenomena appear to be
the result of an immense, unconscious working, that as a rule is beyond the reach of our analysis. Perceptible
phenomena may be compared to the waves, which are the expression on the surface of the ocean of deep-lying 
disturbances of which we know nothing. So far as the majority of their acts are considered, crowds display a 
singularly inferior mentality; yet there are other acts in which they appear to be guided by those mysterious forces
which the ancients denominated destiny, nature, or providence, which we call the voices of the dead, and whose 
power it is impossible to overlook, although we ignore their essence. It would seem, at times, as if there were
latent forces in the inner being of nations which serve to guide them. What, for instance, can be more complicated,
more logical, more marvellous than a language? Yet whence can this admirably organised production have arisen,
except it be the outcome of the unconscious genius of crowds? The most learned academics, the most esteemed 
grammarians can do no more than note down the laws that govern languages; they would be utterly incapable of 
creating them. Even with respect to the ideas of great men are we certain that they are exclusively the offspring of
their brains? No doubt such ideas are always created by solitary minds, but is it not the genius of crowds that has 
furnished the thousands of grains of dust forming the soil in which they have sprung up?

Crowds, doubtless, are always unconscious, but this very unconsciousness is perhaps one of the secrets of their 
strength. In the natural world beings exclusively governed by instinct accomplish acts whose marvellous complexity
astounds us. Reason is an attribute of humanity of too recent date and still too imperfect to reveal to us the laws of
the unconscious, and still more to take its place. The part played by the unconscious in all our acts is immense, 
and that played by reason very small. The unconscious acts like a force still unknown.

If we wish, then, to remain within the narrow but safe limits within which science can attain to knowledge, and not to 
wander in the domain of vague conjecture and vain hypothesis, all we must do is simply to take note of such 
phenomena as are accessible to us, and confine ourselves to their consideration. Every conclusion drawn from our
observation is, as a rule, premature, for behind the phenomena which we see clearly are other phenomena that we
see indistinctly, and perhaps behind these latter, yet others which we do not see at all.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION
The Era of Crowds 

BOOK I: The Mind of Crowds
Chapter I General Characteristics of Crowds—Psychological Law of Their Mental Unity 
Chapter II The Sentiments and Morality of Crowds 
Chapter III The Ideas, Reasoning Power, and Imagination of Crowds 
Chapter IV A Religious Shape Assumed by All the Convictions of Crowds 

BOOK II: The Opinions and Beliefs of Crowds
Chapter I Remote Factors of the Opinions and Beliefs of Crowds 
Chapter II The Immediate Factors of the Opinions of Crowds
Chapter III The Leaders of Crowds and Their Means of Persuasion 
Chapter IV Limitations of the Variability of the Beliefs and Opinions of Crowds 

BOOK III: The Classification and Description of the Different Kinds of Crowds
Chapter I The Classification of Crowds 
Chapter II Crowds Termed Criminal Crowds 
Chapter III Criminal Juries 
Chapter IV Electoral Crowds 
Chapter V Parliamentary Assemblies

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