This book is included in the Self Reliance Communications section.
Contents
HASC Oversight & Investigations Members
HASC Oversight & Investigations Staff
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
JIEDDO Today
Are We Winning the Battle Against IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan?
The Future of JIEDDO
Findings and Recommendations
Issues for Further Study
Conclusion
Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms
Appendix B: Hearings, Briefings, Interviews
Appendix C: Supporting Documents
Executive Summary
The end of major combat operations in Iraq in 2003 was merely the
beginning of a different fight, a fight in which an unconventional
weapon has had a deadly impact on conventional forces. The Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) has proven to be the number one threat to
Coalition Forces in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. Its use is spreading.
In
response to this relatively cheap and somewhat unsophisticated killer,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested billions of dollars and
established a large organization with one goal: to defeat IEDs. The
Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) has had some success in this
mission, but the use of IEDs persists. Because of the resources invested
in JIEDDO and the urgency of its charge, it is important to assess the
entity as it stands today and consider its role for the future.
Therefore, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations conducted this study to answer two questions: (1) Is
JIEDDO winning the Counter-IED (C-IED) fight in Iraq and Afghanistan?
and (2) What is the Department’s longterm plan for JIEDDO and for
addressing other asymmetric threats?
JIEDDO’s actions and activities fall under three lines of operation: (1)
“Defeat the Device,” (2) “Attack the Network,” and (3) “Train the
Force.” The primary focus of the Defeat the Device effort is on
neutralizing the IED after it is emplaced. This includes funding the
development of technical and non-technical countermeasures and the
ability to rapidly field new equipment. Attack the Network activities
aim to find and eliminate bomb makers and their supporters before they
can assemble and emplace IEDs. The C-IED Operations Integration Center,
JIEDDO’s hub for fusing operations and intelligence information, is the
primary enabler for JIEDDO’s support for attacking IED networks.
Finally, the Joint Center of Excellence supports training for U.S.
personnel on how to protect themselves from IED. Although JIEDDO spends
more than $4 billion annually under these three lines of operation and
reports significant progress, this study concludes that it is not clear
how well the organization is accomplishing its mission. Our findings
include:
♦ JIEDDO is supposed to be the focal point for all Department of Defense actions to defeat IEDs; however, JIEDDO does not actively lead all DOD C-IED efforts.
♦ JIEDDO relies on certain C-IED statistics to justify its claims of success; however, these metrics do not effectively capture or accurately reflect its performance.
♦ One of JIEDDO’s strengths is its large budget and flexible appropriations; however, considering the substantial appropriations JIEDDO receives, additional oversight would serve the mission and the nation well.
♦ The Department quickly turned an ad hoc Army Task Force into today’s multibillion dollar JIEDDO; however, despite the recent decision to institutionalize the organization, questions concerning JIEDDO’s future remain. For instance, some believe JIEDDO’s “laser-like” focus on the IED threat is essential, while others suggest that JIEDDO should expand the scope of its mission to counter other asymmetric threats.
This report examines these and other issues surrounding JIEDDO. The
Subcommittee offers findings and recommendations to the Department of Defense as it
continues its battle to protect service members from IEDs—the number one combat killer in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
INTRODUCTION
IEDs are the enemy's equivalent of artillery, and artillery has
always been the largest killer on the battlefield.
General Montgomery C. Meigs, USA (Ret.)
Former Director, JIEDDO1
The deadliest threat to our military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). In 2004, senior military
commanders called for a “Manhattan Project-like” effort against IEDs,
and the Department of Defense (DOD) later established the Joint IED
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The United States has since spent
nearly $14 billion on JIEDDO and its predecessor organizations in an
effort to keep up with this ever-changing threat. This figure does not
include what has been spent by the Services and other agencies. The
Subcommittee initiated this study to try to answer two questions:
Is JIEDDO winning the Counter-IED (C-IED) battle in Afghanistan and Iraq today?
What is the Department’s long-term plan for JIEDDO, specifically, and for addressing IEDs and other asymmetric threats, in general?
BACKGROUND
In 2004, Coalition Forces in Iraq faced an ever-increasing threat from a new weapon,
the IED. They had little means to counter it. The term “IED” represents a wide range of
explosive devices and detonators, from a simple artillery shell detonated by a “command”
wire, to the relatively sophisticated and more lethal Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP)
detonated by a motion sensor. The improvised nature of these weapons means that they can
be quickly and easily modified to overcome countermeasures developed to defeat them.
Moreover, those who use IEDs against military or civilian targets can do so with little risk to
themselves, since the stationary devices can usually be emplaced without detection and then
detonated remotely. The reference to the Manhattan Project by U.S. Central Command
leaders was meant to convey the need for a large-scale, focused effort, combining the nation’s
best scientific minds with nearly unconstrained resources to develop technical solutions to the
problem. Starting in 2004, the Department engaged in a significant effort to develop and field
electronic jammers, vehicle armor, and IED detection and pre-detonation techniques
rapidly—all defensive measures dealing with the IED after it had been emplaced. These
efforts were necessary responses for reducing casualties quickly, but they did not prevent an
increased use of IEDs.
When used exclusively, these defensive efforts—what are collectively referred to as
“Defeat the Device” efforts—left the IEDs intact if an electronic jammer was used, and the
IED emplacers virtually untouched. They effectively allowed anti-Coalition Forces in Iraq to
produce and emplace IEDs with relative impunity. Early in the fight, several experts
recommended placing greater emphasis on an offensive approach to counter IEDs by
targeting the individuals, or terrorist and insurgent networks, producing and emplacing IEDs.2
These efforts are referred to as “Attack the Network” efforts. Initial attempts were erratic and
slow to develop. Today, JIEDDO directs a well-resourced effort to attack enemy networks
that use IEDs.
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