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Council on Foreign Relations
Center for Preventative Action; Council Special Report No. 42
Foreword North Korea poses difficult challenges for U.S. foreign policy. It possesses nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them, and despite some progress, it is by no means clear that the ongoing Six-Party Talks will be able to reveal the full extent of the country’s nuclear activities, much less persuade Pyongyang to give them up. The United States maintains tens of thousands of forces on the Korean peninsula in support of its commitments to the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a country with which the North is still technically at war. And the peninsula sits in a strategically vital region, where the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea all have important interests at stake. All of this puts a premium on close attention to and knowledge of developments in North Korea. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-Il’s government is perhaps the world’s most difficult to read or even see. This Council Special Report, commissioned by the Council’s Center for Preventive Action and authored by Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, focuses on how to manage one of the central unknowns: the prospect of a change in North Korea’s leadership. The report examines three scenarios: managed succession, in which the top post transitions smoothly; contested succession, in which government officials or factions fight for power after Kim’s demise; and failed succession, in which a new government cannot cement its legitimacy, possibly leading to North Korea’s collapse. The authors consider the challenges that these scenarios would pose—ranging from securing Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal to providing humanitarian assistance—and analyze the interests of the United States and others. They then provide recommendations for U.S. policy. In particular, they urge Washington to bolster its contingency planning and capabilities in cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and others, and to build a dialogue with China that could address each side’s concerns. With Kim Jong-Il’s health uncertain and with a new U.S. president in office, this report could not be more timely. And with all the issues at stake on the Korean peninsula, the subject could not be more important. Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea is a thoughtful work that provides valuable insights for managing a scenario sure to arise in the coming months or years. Richard N. Haass, President Council on Foreign Relations January 2009 Introduction For most of the 1990s, North Korea was under what can only be called a prolonged deathwatch, so common and confident were predictions of its demise. Despite suffering acute economic stress from the loss of its principal economic patron—the Soviet Union—in 1991, the sudden death of its founding father––Kim Il-Sung––in 1994, and then soon after a devastating famine that may have claimed as many as a million lives, North Korea managed to survive. By decade’s end, North Korea’s extraordinary resilience, combined with its defiant and at times belligerent attitude to the rest of the world, had convinced most experts that this was not a country about to pass either quickly or quietly into the history books. Since then, the conventional wisdom among most if not all North Korea watchers is that it will muddle through indefinitely even if its long-term future remains doubtful. There are certainly good reasons to be skeptical about the possibility of fundamental political change in North Korea, certainly through a “people-power” type social movement that have toppled dictatorships elsewhere. The country’s cult-like political system, its relative geographical and political isolation, the absence of any real civil society, and repressive state control all clearly reduce the impetus and opportunities for change from below. To the extent that speculation about the survival of the North Korean regime has continued to surface periodically, it has typically involved uncertainties about the succession of Kim Jong-Il, the country’s paramount leader since his father’s death in 1994. With no clearly designated successor, the possibility of a leadership crisis should he be incapacitated or die suddenly has been regularly mentioned as a potential source of instability and even regime change. However, Kim Jong-Il’s apparent vigor in public appearances and private meetings with foreign dignitaries, his young age (early sixties) relative to his father’s when he died (eighty-two), and the possibility that any of his three sons could be groomed to replace him were all reasons to believe that a succession crisis would not happen any time soon––if at all. These confident assumptions about North Korea have recently been jolted by reports that Kim Jong-Il suffered a debilitating stroke in early August 2008 after he failed to appear at an event celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the state. Despite official protestations of his good health, Kim Jong-Il disappeared from sight for several months with many rumors circulating about his physical and mental impairment.2 However, with no outward signs that a leadership transition is under way, the prevailing expectation is that he is recuperating and the situation will eventually return to the status quo ante. It is possible, however, that Kim Jong-Il’s condition may actually be much worse than press reports suggest and that his capacity to govern ––if it hasn’t already been seriously compromised––may be short lived. There has long been speculation that he is a diabetic and therefore prone to kidney failure, heart complications, and at a higher risk of stroke. Indeed, preparations for his succession may already have begun (or been accelerated) but discreetly, to prepare the rest of the country for the transition. The designated leader or leaders may even have assumed considerable governing powers with both Kim’s blessing and the support of other senior members of the regime. Given how little we know about the inner workings of North Korea, this is entirely plausible. If true, continuity of the regime, albeit under new leadership, will have been maintained with most likely minimal impact on the rest of North Korea and its outward posture. However, other scenarios that bring about more fundamental change to North Korea should not be summarily dismissed. It is possible, for example, that succession planning would not proceed smoothly––if at all––leaving a vacuum at the top or a weak transitional arrangement should Kim suffer a fatal relapse. This might tempt certain individuals or factions to seize power, resulting in a potentially disruptive and even violent leadership struggle. What outcome might ensue and what course North Korea might take as a consequence is impossible to predict, but a prolonged and potentially violent contest for supremacy in Pyongyang—North Korea’s capital––would undoubtedly place immense stress on the rest of the country, given how much the state is controlled from the center. Resilient though it has proven to be, North Korea is still a fundamentally weak state.4 Its economy has never recovered from the contraction of the 1990s and the population remains chronically short of food and other basic necessities. Indeed, before news broke of Kim’s illness, the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) had warned that the country was facing widespread food shortages and even famine. Under these circumstances, the uncertainty and stress imposed by a lengthy and perhaps ultimately inconclusive leadership struggle on the overall system of governance might prove too much. As numerous cases from around the world attest, totalitarian states––despite outward signs of strength––are remarkably brittle when stressed by internal forces. North Korea is an exceptional state for all the reasons outlined, but at a certain point the pressures could become too intense for the country to stay intact. In this case, earlier predictions of collapse and the end of North Korea as an independent sovereign state might finally come to pass. These various scenarios would present the United States and the neighboring states with challenges and dilemmas that, depending on how events were to unfold, could grow in size and complexity. Important and vital interests are at stake for all concerned. North Korea is hardly a normal country located in a strategic backwater of the world. As a nuclear weapons state and exporter of ballistic missile systems, it has long been a serious proliferation concern to Washington. With one of the world’s largest armies in possession of huge numbers of long-range artillery and missiles, it can also wreak havoc on America’s most important Asian allies––South Korea and Japan––both of which are home to large numbers of American citizens and host to major U.S. garrisons committed to their defense. Moreover, North Korea abuts two great powers—China and Russia––that have important interests at stake in the future of the peninsula. That they would become actively engaged in any future crisis involving North Korea is virtually guaranteed. Although all the interested powers share a basic interest in maintaining peace and stability in northeast Asia, a major crisis from within North Korea could lead to significant tensions and––as in the past––even conflict between them. A contested or prolonged leadership struggle in Pyongyang would inevitably raise questions in Washington about whether the United States should try to sway the outcome.5 Some will almost certainly argue that only by promoting regime change will the threat now posed by North Korea as a global proliferator, as a regional menace to America’s allies, and as a massive human rights violator, finally disappear. Such views could gain some currency in Seoul and even Tokyo, though it seems unlikely. Beijing, however, would certainly look on any attempt to promote a pro-American regime in Pyongyang as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and a challenge to China’s national interests. This and other potential sources of friction could intensify should the situation in North Korea deteriorate. The impact of a severe power struggle in Pyongyang on the availability of food and other basic services could cause tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee North Korea. The pressure on neighboring countries to intervene with humanitarian assistance and use their military to stem the flow of refugees would likely grow in these circumstances. Suspicions that the situation could be exploited by others for political advantage would add to the pressure to act sooner rather than later in a crisis. China would be the most likely destination for refugees because of its relatively open and porous border; its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has reportedly developed contingency plans to intervene in North Korea for possible humanitarian, peacekeeping, and “environmental control” missions. Besides increasing the risk of dangerous military interactions and unintended escalation in sensitive borders areas, China’s actions would likely cause considerable consternation in South Korea about its ultimate intentions toward the peninsula. China no doubt harbors similar fears about potential South Korean and American intervention in the North. Should the situation unravel further and North Korea begin to collapse entirely, another set of issues would come to the fore and likely place still more strain on allied cooperation and regional stability. For South Korea, the disintegration of the North Korean state would present both the opportunity to reunify the Korean people and the challenge of coping with the aftermath of change. Having seen the enormous social and economic costs that reunification imposed on Germany, Seoul might balk at rapid absorption and choose instead a slower, incremental path—assuming it had the choice. Although Washington’s inclination will be to defer to Seoul’s wishes, it may still prefer not to delay or risk the opportunity for Korean reunification that it has long seen as desirable for the stability of northeast Asia. The possibility, therefore, of discord arising between Washington and Seoul over the pace and character of reunification is not inconceivable. In any case, Washington’s acute concern about the security and safety of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction might force it to take unilateral action. Such action could put it at odds with Seoul, not to mention Beijing. Tokyo’s legitimate concerns would also need to be taken into account. China’s likely preference in such circumstances would be to sustain North Korea as an independent state for as long as possible. Should that goal prove untenable, Beijing would seek to preserve important Chinese interests, such as maintaining strategic depth, regional influence, and economic stability—all of which could bring it into conflict with Washington and Seoul. The prospect of North Korea being absorbed by South Korea and U.S. forces potentially being deployed near China’s northeastern border are matters of acute concern. The same fears helped trigger China’s entry into the Korean War. Moscow undoubtedly shares many of Beijing’s concerns, though Russia appears less poised to intervene should the situation deteriorate. Its diplomatic and possibly logistical support would still be critical in managing a major crisis on the peninsula. However, with the deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations since the Georgia crisis of August 2008, Russia’s role in any future North Korean contingency might not be as passive or as cooperative as many have so far assumed. How the potential challenges associated with sudden, destabilizing change in North Korea are handled will have profound consequences for the subsequent evolution of Korea, the stability of northeast Asia, and the future course of U.S.-China relations. Unfortunately, there are good reasons to be concerned about the level of preparedness of all the principal actors, including the United States and its allies, and with it the potential for misunderstanding and outright discord. During the 1990s, when it looked as if North Korea would collapse, the United States and South Korea began to consider a range of contingencies involving instability in the North. These discussions were designed largely to improve military -to-military coordination and rarely involved joint political or civilian consultation. Seoul has in fact been reluctant to share details about its own national reunification plans with Washington. Once the likelihood of a North Korea collapse receded, this planning ceased to be a high priority. For Seoul, the imperative shifted to preventing rather than managing instability and sudden collapse in North Korea through a deliberate policy of direct engagement designed to help Pyongyang feed its citizens and develop economically. Thus, when the United States pressed South Korea in 2005 to upgrade an earlier joint concept of operations plan (CONPLAN 5029) that addressed various sources of instability in North Korea and turn it into a more detailed and concrete operational plan (OPLAN), the initiative was rebuffed out of fear that it would antagonize Pyongyang and limit Seoul’s sovereign prerogatives in a crisis. Tokyo also developed plans in the 1990s to prepare for the possibility that North Korea might suddenly collapse, but Japan’s pacifist constitution has limited the scope of joint planning and coordination with the United States. More important, historical animosities and continuing political frictions with South Korea over a variety of issues have effectively prevented any real allied dialogue among the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan, much less contingency planning for instability in North Korea. Over the same period, China has remained reluctant to engage in any sustained dialogue about the possibility of political instability with other contingencies in the North for fear of alienating its relationship with its erstwhile Cold War ally. High-level political consultations and military-to-military discussions have taken place between the United States and China in recent years, but they have left little room for anything more than superficial exchanges on the topic. Even the Six-Party diplomatic process involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas aimed at denuclearizing the peninsula has provided little opportunity to build consensus among the principal players. Its deliberations beyond the issues of nuclear disarmament have been general and the involvement of North Korea limits the scope for discussion. Given these concerns, the purpose of this Council Special Report is to encourage greater attention and heightened preparedness by the United States to meet the potential challenges of sudden and destabilizing change in North Korea. The report is organized into three parts. The first examines in greater detail a range of plausible scenarios that might be precipitated with the succession of Kim Jong-Il. The intent is not to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate how events might unfold in significant and challenging ways. The second part analyzes the potential implications of these scenarios for the United States and other principal actors. The third and final section proposes some guiding principles as well as a set of practical policy recommendations to help the United States prepare for the possibility of sudden and destabilizing change in North Korea. These measures have been conceived and designed in ways that recognize the obvious international sensitivities about discussing the future of North Korea, especially given that it remains a critical partner in various endeavors, not least the denuclearization of the peninsula. In the best of circumstances, governments rarely want to discuss their national contingency plans or divulge how they intend to react in a given situation. Although this puts real constraints on the level of cooperation in advance of a major crisis in North Korea, the risks are too great and the stakes too high to rely on last-minute improvisation for a peaceful and stable outcome. CONTENTS Foreword Acknowledgments Map Acronyms Council Special Report Introduction Scenarios for Change in North Korea Challenges and Dilemmas Recommendations for U.S. Policy Endnotes About the Authors Advisory Committee CPA Advisory Committee CPA Mission Statement End of Preview.
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