This book is included in the Self Reliance Self Defense section.
Foreword. This publication is for those forces who could possibly deploy to different parts of the world to provide humanitarian assistance to the populace, assist in the restoration of peace between belligerent forces, and possibly conduct peace enforcement operations. This handbook provides insights into Operations Other Than War, highlights major preventive medicine lessons, and provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for the soldier. The information in this handbook does not replicate that presently found in doctrinal publications. It is not intended to serve as a guide for the conduct of operations and training. Rather, this handbook is designed to highlight information and lessons that are applicable to the unique environment offered by OOTW. The OOTW efforts pose many unique challenges not faced by our military forces in recent operations. Of utmost concern is the need to care for the health and welfare of deployed U. S. forces. Disease, the lack of sanitation and death are daily circumstances associated with the collapse of governmental infrastructure, civil war, natural disasters, and civil disturbances. Training for OOTW should have minimal impact on a unit s primary mission of fighting and winning in combat; in fact, peace enforcement employs most combat skills. An important requirement for success in OOTW is the successful application of our warfighting skills. OOTW are not new missions and do not require major changes to the mission-essential task list (METL); rather, they require a better understanding of the environment in which they are conducted. The key to sustaining a unit s warfighting ability and becoming proficient in expanding peace operations is TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING! JOE N. FRAZAR III Brigadier General, USA Deputy Commanding General for Training Introduction Today, the U. S. Army is performing a variety of missions that fall under the category of "Operations Other Than War (OOTW)." Two of these missions are peacekeeping and peace enforcement. To understand these OOTW missions, you must first understand the terms "Peacemaking," "Peacekeeping," and "Peace Enforcement." PEACEMAKING - Efforts to settle a conflict through mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement. Peacemaking is normally carried out by diplomats and politicians. It combines negotiation with nonmilitary tools of coercion to achieve a resolution of a conflict. When these tools are inadequate, military tools may be used to establish and maintain, forcibly if necessary, a cessation of hostilities. A stable environment better allows diplomats to pursue a peaceful solution to the conflict. Peacemaking normally precedes the initiation of military operations. Peacemaking occurs simultaneously with, and continues throughout the duration of, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The political goals and objectives established for the peacemaking effort help define the military objectives of the intervening forces and provide the commander parameters within which to develop supporting operational planning and execution. Thus, peacemaking constitutes the political framework for application of military force. Without a peacemaking effort, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations will always fail. Even if military force is authorized by the UN, all military operations involve continuous negotiation, with all parties, and at many different levels. This can be a time-consuming and frustrating business. However, negotiation saves unnecessary loss of life and offers the best long-term prospects for a final peaceful settlement. PEACEKEEPING - The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to maintain peace. A Definition: "OPERATIONS CONDUCTED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES, DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A NEGOTIATED TRUCE AND HELP PROMOTE CONDITIONS WHICH SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A LONG-TERM PEACE IN AREAS OF CONFLICT." -FM 100-5 NOTES: 1. . SUCCESS BASED ON WILLINGNESS OF BELLIGERENTS TO ABIDE BY TRUCE . SYNONYMOUS WITH TRUCE-KEEPING. . AN INTERIM STEP TOWARD RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT. . PEACEKEEPING FORCE MUST BE PERCEIVED AS NEUTRAL BY ALL DISPUTING PARTIES. . PEACEKEEPING FORCE MUST ALWAYS BE PREPARED FOR A QUICKLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PEACE ENFORCEMENT OR COMBAT MAY OCCUR. The UN Secretary General defines peacekeeping as "The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace." Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution. The U. S. may participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of an international organization, such as the United Nations, in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally. Peacekeeping operations may take many forms of supervision and monitoring: . Withdrawals and Disengagements . Cease-fires . Prisoner-of-War Exchanges . Arms Control . Demilitarization and Demobilization Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain the peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. The greatest military consideration in peacekeeping is the political objective of the operation. Military forces operate within clearly and carefully prescribed limits established by agreement between the belligerents and the UN or other parties. Normally, a peacekeeping force will deploy after the fighting has ceased. The nationality of the force is agreed to by the belligerents. Once the fighting has ceased, peacekeepers selected from the 181 members of the United Nations are deployed. The peacekeeping force ends up being an invited guest. One or both of the belligerents can revoke the invitation and request the peacekeepers to leave the area at any time. In the past, traditional peacekeeping was feasible because two conditions existed before peacekeepers were inserted: fighting had ceased, and both or all parties preferred the presence of the peacekeepers to their absence. Under these two conditions, the typical peacekeeping force has evolved. It has historically been a lightly armed, defensively oriented observer force that physically separated former combatants. It observed and reported its adherence to the cease fire while negotiations for peace occurred. Its mission usually involves monitoring and supervising a cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants. It occurs in an atmosphere where truce exists and where the former combatants minimally prefer truce to continued conflict. Peacekeeping forces assume that use of force will not be required to carry out their tasks, except in self-defense. They are structured, trained and equipped under this assumption. Extreme restraint in both appearance and application of force is crucial to maintain a posture of impartiality and neutrality toward the former belligerents. Finally, peacekeeping forces possess a quality often called the "hostage effect." Lightly armed and operating under restrictive rules of engagement, the peacekeeping force derives protection from the belligerents by its inability to change the military balance and its nonthreatening posture. This allows the force unimpeded access throughout the country to carry out its duties. This is normally a condition required by the UN mandate for the operation. Conversely, the peacekeeping force represents a potentially much larger force, and this is the source of its power. PEACE ENFORCEMENT - Military operations by sea, air or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, whether or not the belligerents are consenting to the intervention. A Definition: MILITARY OPERATIONS (INCLUDING POSSIBLE COMBAT ACTIONS)IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS WHO MAY BE ENGAGED IN COMBAT ACTIVITIES. NOTES: . FORCE MAY OR MAY NOT BE UNDER UN COMMAND. . DOES NOT HAVE TO END IN COMBAT. . A SUBSET OF ARMED INTERVENTION. . INTERVENTION FORCE NOT PERCEIVED AS NEUTRAL. . INTERNATIONAL MANDATE REQUIRED. Peace enforcement entails the use of armed force to separate combatants and to create a cease fire that does not exist. Force may also be used to create other peaceful ends such as safe havens for victims of the hostilities. The UN Secretary General also uses the term to refer to forceful actions to keep a cease fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease fire. By the American definition, in a situation for which peace enforcement operations are required, armed conflict and not peace describes the situation. Also, one or more of the belligerents usually prefers it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are not welcomed by one of the belligerents. Rather, the peace enforcers are active fighters who must force a cease fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, they lose their neutrality. Peace enforcement operations are usually beyond the UN s ability to command, control, and plan. They may be carried out by a coalition of countries or by a regional organization such as NATO. Peace enforcement operations are likely to disregard state sovereignty, particularly if the mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and has not invited the peace enforcers into their territory. For this reason, an international mandate is normally necessary for the operation to be considered legitimate. Because the enforcement force may resort to the use of arms against the belligerents, it must deploy with sufficient military strength to achieve those objectives established by political authorities. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement will require a full range of military capabilities that has the potential to meet or exceed that of the belligerents. Although the preferred objective is the commitment of superior military force to dissuade belligerents from further conflict, forces deployed for these operations should assume for planning purposes that use of force will be necessary to restore peace. But unlike war, enforcement operations are more constrained by political factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table. Settlement, not victory, is the goal. The peace enforcement force will presumably have to fight its way into the combat zone and use force to physically separate the combatants. It will likely inflict and suffer casualties, possibly making it less welcome and undercutting domestic support back home for its mission. The peace enforcement force is not suited for transition to a peacekeeping force primarily because it can never be considered neutral again. Peace enforcement cannot solve the underlying problems in most areas of potential application. The insertion of force to stop combat may be effective in making the continuation of violence impossible; it cannot, in and of itself, create the conditions for lasting peace, which involves the political embrace of peace as more attractive than war. The insertion of outside force may break the cycle of violence and convince the combatants that resistance to the peace enforcers is more painful than compliance to an imposed peace. Since these conflicts are normally very deeply rooted and desperate, the shock effect of outside force may prove to be no more than a break between rounds of fighting. There is a danger in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace enforcement situations. Peace enforcement requires very different forces than does peacekeeping. The result of confusing roles and forces can be seen in the placing of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers in a war zone in Sarajevo. These peacekeepers were placed in a peace enforcement situation and have proven not to be armed and manned for the task. Political and military decisionmakers must understand and clearly specify the nature of the mission of forces deployed to assist in restoring peace. Further, they must continuously review the circumstances under which the force was committed to ensure it remains suited to that mission. The catastrophic failure of the Multi-National Forces in Lebanon in 1983 may present a vivid example of what happens when the wrong type of force is used. The following chapters present some specific lessons from past and present peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. They are intended to help prepare units to perform the missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These lessons will present a topic, a discussion, and then the lessons. The topics apply to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations unless otherwise stated. The new Field Manual (FM 100-23, Peace Support Operations) provides a detailed discussion of doctrinal issues. Contents FOREWORD CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER II: TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTP) IN SUPPORT OF OOTW CHAPTER III: PREVENTIVE MEDICINE FOR THE SOLDIER APPENDIX A: CHECKLISTS End of Preview.
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